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INTRODUCTION

to issue an (inaptly named)
HE Supreme
habeasauthority
corpus is, paradoxically, perhaps its
original
writ ofCourt's
most exotic form of appellate power. The Court frequently decides
habeas cases, but only pursuant to its authority to entertain certiorari petitions from lower courts. Few are even aware that the Court
or its Justices may issue an original habeas writ, directing the release of a prisoner, from their own chambers. Such relief has not
issued since 1925,' and the leading Supreme Court treatise describes the jurisdiction as an anachronism.2 Until last year, a halfcentury had elapsed before the Court exercised even its related
original habeas power to transfer a petition within the federal judiciary.'
The peculiar role of original habeas was fixed during the early
days of the American Republic. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution specifies nine categories of subject matter to which the federal "Judicial Power" extends.! Section 2 also subdivides the Supreme Court's authority over those nine categories into original
and appellate jurisdiction, with the latter subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."'
The Court's original jurisdiction includes only "Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in

T

'See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
See Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice: For Practice in the Supreme
Court of the United States 662 (9th ed. 2007).
See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009); Hayes v. Maryland, 370 U.S. 931, 931 (1962);
Chaapel v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 869, 869 (1962).
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Three categories are specified by subject matter, and
six categories are specified by the parties to a dispute. See id.
' Id. § 2, cl. 2.
2
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which a State shall be Party." 6 Article III judicial power includes
the authority to grant habeas writs, but Section 2 does not specify
that jurisdiction as original. Marbury v. Madison held, among other
things, that Congress may not accrete or diminish the Court's
original jurisdiction.! In 1807, Ex parte Bollman nonetheless sustained the constitutionality of the Court's nominally original habeas power as functionally appellate.
For most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court lacked
conventional appellate authority to review federal criminal confinement.9 Its original habeas jurisdiction was therefore an exceptionally important source of appellate power. Around the turn of
the twentieth century, however, Congress created a series of jurisdictional alternatives rendering original habeas an obsolete form of
appellate authority: it vested in petitioners a limited right of appeal
from lower court habeas decisions,o empowered the Court to issue
writs of error in criminal cases," and created statutory certiorari jurisdiction to enable discretionary review.12 After 1925, original habeas quickly became a dead letter.13
In August 2009, by transferring a capital prisoner's original habeas petition to a federal district court rather than dismissing it
outright, In re Davisl4 abruptly thrust this obscure power back into
mainstream legal debate over both the death penalty and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Faced with particularly strong
evidence that Davis did not commit the murder for which he was
convicted, the Court exercised its original habeas power to bypass
a statutory authorization proceeding and transferred the case to a

'Id.
'See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
'See 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100-01 (1807). For an extensive discussion of Bollman's
holdings, see Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 159-61 (1962).
'See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76-89; see also United States v. More,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159,173-74 (1805).
nSee Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437, 437.
"See Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655, 656 (making the writ available in
capital cases); Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891)
(extending the writ of error to all offenses punishable by imprisonment).
See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, 26 Stat. at 828.
See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) (granting the original writ for the last
time).
4

1

130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
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U.S. district court for merits adjudication." The petition was the
first that the Court had transferred under its original habeas power
in almost fifty years. 6 Scrambling to understand how the authority
has evolved since its nineteenth-century heyday, commentators
have been severely limited by the absence of any data reporting the
attributes of the original petitions themselves. I have filled that
empirical void by collecting, compiling, and analyzing the only
modem original habeas data, and this Article presents those results
for the first time. The data shows that the vast majority of original
petitioners are criminally confined (as opposed to imprisoned by
the military or pursuant to immigration proceedings) but that these
prisoners are not engaged in the first round of collateral attacks on
that confinement. Original writ procedure is now primarily a vehicle for litigating "successive" habeas corpus petitions that are otherwise subject to severe jurisdictional limits in the federal courts."
In this Article, I argue that Davis is not a blip in an otherwise
constant state of original habeas inactivity. The original writ may
be in the midst of a renaissance, emerging as a last-resort means of
averting wrongful executions. In Part I, I observe that the availability of original habeas relief has historically exhibited two overarching characteristics: (1) that the Supreme Court's Article III appellate power to grant it has expanded alongside the Article III
judicial power to issue habeas writs common to all federal courts;
and (2) that the Court does not exercise that authority when it may
avail itself of jurisdictional alternatives. In Part II, I present data
confirming that the availability of conventional appellate jurisdiction exerts the dominant influence on the composition of the mod-

" Id. The district court has since denied relief on the merits. See In re Davis, No.
CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 719 (11th
Cir. 2010). As of this Article's publication date, the Supreme Court is considering appellate review of this question. See Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2011) (No. 10-949); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Davis v. Humphrey, No. 10-949 (Jan. 21, 2011).
6 See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1; Byrnes v. Walker, 371 U.S. 937, 937 (1962); Chaapel v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 869, 869 (1962). Justice Douglas transferred a case in his capacity
as an individual Justice in 1973. See Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1973). I discuss Davis much more extensively in Section III.A, infra.
" See infra Subsection II.B.4.
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ern original habeas docket." For over fifteen original habeas variables, I present twenty years of data, during which the number of
petitions has increased tenfold. The data shows that most petitioners now seeking original writs are using the procedure to avoid restrictions on successive petitions filed with other courts in the federal judiciary. In Part III, I advance what I call the "capital safety
valve paradigm"-the idea that, in light of the habeas writ's current
substantive scope and modern limits on appellate jurisdiction,
original habeas should and likely will emerge as a means to ensure
that the death penalty is not erroneously imposed.
I. ORIGINAL HABEAS AS SUPREME COURT POWER OF LAST RESORT

Magna Carta provided that English kings be bound by law, and
habeas corpus thereafter developed into the primary remedy for
unlawful imprisonment." The writ requires a jailor to show the authority under which it detains a prisoner.20 Article I of the Constitution bars suspension of the habeas "privilege" except in cases of
rebellion or invasion." In England, habeas was first a prerogative
writ that issued from the King's Bench to a jailing custodian acting
under color of the King's legal franchise.22 The word "privilege" actually referred (at least initially) to the prerogative of the King, not
to some substantive right belonging to a prisoner.2
Both in England and in the early American Republic, the writ
evolved from a Royal (executive) privilege into a prisoner's remedial entitlement." This conceptual drift means that the writ's sub'8 Technically speaking, there is no "original habeas docket." Original habeas proceedings are docketed on the Court's Miscellaneous Docket.
" See generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 582-88
(2008) (tracing the history of the habeas writ).
"'3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *131 (stating that habeas corpus "run[s] into
all parts of the king's dominions: for the king is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may
be inflicted") (footnote omitted).
21 "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2.
2 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740-41 (2008); Halliday & White, supra
note 19, at 593-94.
' See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740-41; Halliday & White, supra note 19, at 593.
4 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741; Halliday & White, supra note 19, at 593-607.
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stantive scope at any given time remains a source of considerable
academic disagreement.' Generally speaking, the American writ
issues to test the legality of detention.26 The Judiciary Act of 1789
made the writ available to federal prisoners,. and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 made it available to prisoners in state custody.&
Prisoners usually petition for habeas writs in federal district court,
and the modern Supreme Court ordinarily uses its statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review habeas decisions.29 A prisoner, however,
may also petition the Court for original habeas relief.
Whether the Supreme Court has original habeas jurisdictionand
whether it should grant habeas reliefon the merits are two separate
concepts. In practice, however, that taxonomy is hardly as neat as it
sounds. The jurisdictional issue subdivides into at least three different inquiries that constitute the backbone of Part I. First, is
original habeas relief unconstitutional under Marbury v. Madison3
because it is an exercise of original jurisdiction not specified in Article III, Section 2?" Second, even if original habeas relief is an appellate remedy, has Congress statutorily authorized the Court to
issue it?3 2 Finally, when the Court does identify a limit on original
habeas jurisdiction, is it a limit common to all federal courts or is it
unique to the Court's appellate jurisdiction to revise use of Article
III judicial power?"
' See generally 1 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 2.2 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing and providing extensive sourcing
for the proposition that habeas is inconsistently characterized).
6 See Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1968).
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. What modem criminally confined federal prisoners currently seek under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not, technically speaking, habeas corpus relief. It is denominated as a motion to vacate a judgment. The
§ 2255 remedy is nonetheless functionally equivalent to the remedies available to
criminally confined state claimants in virtually all meaningful respects. See Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681 n.1 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissentinE in part).
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385,385-86.
29
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (military commission);
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 355-56 (2005) (§ 2255 challenge to federal criminal confinement); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237 (2005) (§ 2254 challenge to
state criminal confinement); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 293 (2001) (immigration).
*5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3
32

See infra Section I.A.

See infra Section I.B.
' See infra Section I.C.
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The Supreme Court and Congress have forged original habeas
law in the crucible of America's most significant political, military,
and legal conflicts: the struggle between Thomas Jefferson and
Aaron Burr," the Civil War and Reconstruction 5 the punishment
of German and Japanese combatants after World War II,' and in
the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing." Extracting from these
cases anything that might be called a unifying jurisdictional rule is
impossible because the Court almost always exercises its original
habeas power to resolve nationally important questions for which
some practical consideration arguably dominates more formal legal
concerns.
There are nonetheless at least two important patterns that
emerge from the formative cases. First, since the end of the Civil
War, the Supreme Court has usually phrased limits on its original
habeas jurisdiction as limits on the judicial power common to all
federal courts. As a result, the substantive scope of the Supreme
Court's appellate remedy has grown in rough proportion to the
substantive scope of the writ sought in any other federal court."
Second, the Court does not actually exercise original habeas auSee generally Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Eric M. Freedman,
Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't
Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 531,
558-61 (2000).
" See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1879); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85, 102-03 (1868); Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14
N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 375, 403-09 (1998); Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
America, 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 1, 53-56 (2008).
36See infra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.
37 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-61 (1996) (discussing whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") eliminated original habeas review); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 459-68 (2007) (discussing AEDPA's legislative history and
the Oklahoma City bombing).
" In other words, limits on jurisdiction are usually phrased as limits that would be
applicable without respect to which federal court's authority is being analyzed. For
example, cases barring Supreme Court jurisdiction over certain military commissions
are framed in terms of limits on the federal judicial power to review certain types of
military detention, rather than as limits on the Supreme Court's power to exercise appellate review. See infra Section I.C. There exists a complicated question as to
whether the substantive scope of the Supreme Court remedy is curtailed when Congress restricts the substantive scope of the federal district court writ by statute. To my
knowledge, there is no scholarship on this question.

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 67 2011

68

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:61

thority in the presence of conventional jurisdictional alternatives.
Together, these patterns should help readers understand the meaning of the data in Part II: the exploding number and composition of
original habeas cases is attributable both to growth in the habeas
writ's substantive scope and to restrictions on other appellate jurisdiction.
A. OriginalHabeasas an Appellate Remedy
Marbury's holding that Congress could not augment the Supreme Court's Article III original jurisdiction appeared to be the
death knell for the Court's power to issue habeas writs, which Section 2 does not specify as part of the Court's original authority." In
1807, however, the Court rejected Marbury's implication when it
decided Ex parte Bollman." Like any other appellate tribunal, the
Supreme Court must have both authority to decide the subject
matter and some jurisdictional vehicle by which it may review the
case. Bollman characterized original habeas relief as an appellate
remedy, thereby preserving its constitutionality.4 1
Bollman was an associate of fierce Thomas Jefferson opponent
Aaron Burr and was seized in New Orleans on suspicion of participating in the famous Burr-Wilkinson plot to establish an alternate
empire in the United States.42 When the government returned
Bollman to Washington, D.C., the D.C. Circuit Court (which was
primarily a trial court) issued a bench warrant charging him with
treason.43 With two Jefferson appointees in the majority," that
' See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 17778 (1803). Of course, habeas cases could conceivably constitute cases "in which a
State shall be Party." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. After all, habeas developed as a
claim the Crown asserted against its franchisee on the ground that the franchisee was
abusing the franchise. See authority cited supra notes 22-24. Despite the conceptual
possibilities in the "State as a Party" formulation, it has been pursued in only one case
and was rejected. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 341 (1879).
' 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100-01 (1807).
41 Id.
4 See generally Freedman, supra note 34, at 558-61 (setting forth relevant parts of
the affair). The case actually involved original petitions sought on behalf of Bollman
and a man named Swartwout. See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 75.
43United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1190 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622).
4 The two Jefferson appointees in the lower court majority were Allen Bowie
Duckett and Nicholas Battalle Fitzhugh. See id. Chief Judge William Cranch, whom
Jefferson had elevated to Chief Judge, dissented here. See id.
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court ordered Bollman to be held for trial.45 Bollman sought, and in
an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall was granted, an original habeas writ.' In characterizing original habeas relief as a quintessentially appellate remedy, Bollman established as the touchstone of
appellate jurisdiction the principle that the Court must be "revis[ing]" the decision of an inferior tribunal.47 After Bollman, the
Court could issue habeas writs, but only when some other federal
court had taken judicial action on a petition litigated in its jurisdiction.
In 1833, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Watkins, which expanded the revised decision concept to include any judicial act of
an inferior court. Ex parte Yerger, decided in 1869, further
enlarged that concept to include military confinement, as long as
some inferior Article III court had denied habeas relief.49 In 1880,
Ex parte Siebold held that the Court could use original habeas authority to revise decisions in cases over which it ultimately lacked
writ-of-error jurisdiction over the final order."o Marbury might have
precluded the Court from issuing a habeas writ pursuant to its
original jurisdiction, but Bollman, Watkins, Yerger, and Siebold reestablished the practice as a robust Article III appellate remedy.
Modem jurisdictional questions therefore center not on whether
original habeas relief would revise an exercise of judicial power,
but on the scope of congressional appellate authorization and on
limits to habeas jurisdiction common to all federal courts. I discuss
the historical treatment of these issues in the two Sections that follow.

Id. at 1192.
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101.
Id. at 86.
8 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 572-73 (1833).

45

49

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102-03 (1869); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)

506, 514-15 (1868) (holding that Supreme Court lacked original habeas jurisdiction
over a detention pursuant to the 1867 Military Reconstruction Act because Congress
had, during the pendency of the case, passed legislation effectively repealing the grant
of jurisdiction over these types of cases putatively contained in the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act). Yerger and McCardle receive more extensive treatment in my discussion of
the Exceptions Clause. See infra Section III.B.
5o100 U.S. 371, 374-76 (1880) (holding that the Court could consider a statute's constitutionality even if its authority arose only out of the prisoner's commitment for trial
and if it could not issue a writ of error on the final order).
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B. Statutory Sources of OriginalHabeas Jurisdiction
Congress must statutorily authorize any exercise of Supreme
Court appellate power." In addition to deciding that original habeas writs issued as Article III, Section 2 appellate remedies, Bollman also held that Congress had authorized the Court to issue
them.52 A number of commentators have argued that Bollman's
See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93-94.
See id. at 94-100 (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 73, 8182). Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the statutory ancestor to the modern-day
U.S. Code's habeas and "All Writs" provisions, stated:
[All U. S. courts] shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary
for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles
and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well
as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.-Provided, That
writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where
they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or
are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be
brought into court to testify.
1 Stat. at 81-82. Understanding Bollman's statutory holding requires a short digression involving habeas nomenclature. What we commonly refer to as the "Great Writ"
(of habeas corpus) is actually a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and it is only
one of several English common law habeas writs. Each had a specialized purpose, and
most were simply jurisdictional auxiliaries that did not authorize inquiry into the
cause of a prisoner's detention. See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101, 103-07 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Marshall, writing in Bollman, ultimately read congressional authorization to issue the Great Writ into § 14 of the Judiciary Act. Id. at
94-101. He did so even though the textual case against that interpretation was particularly strong. Section 14's first sentence, which expressly empowers the Court with
some form of habeas authority, reads ejusdem generis not to authorize habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum but to authorize the Court to issue only auxiliary habeas writs necessary to supplement some other appellate power. Although the second sentence of § 14
confers habeas authority to scrutinize the cause of a detention, it vests that power expressly only in Justices individually, rather than in the Court itself. Chief Justice Marshall provided three reasons in support of his interpretation. See id. at 96-101. First,
he reasoned that Congress would not have granted Great Writ authority to individual
Justices without granting it to the Court itself. See id. at 96. Second, he argued that
the first sentence, which did grant writ authority to the Court, must refer to habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum because that was the form of habeas that predominated in
federal courts of the Founding era. See id. at 96-99. Third, because another 1789 Judiciary Act provision created Supreme Court authority to admit bail in capital cases
and because habeas corpus ad subjuciendum was the appropriate procedural vehicle
for bringing prisoners for bail, he contended that § 14 must vest the Court with that
habeas authority. See id. at 99-100. Under this interpretation, the second sentence of
§ 14 was designed only to ensure the availability of habeas relief when the Supreme
Court was not in session. See id. at 96.
52
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statutory holding was wrong," but that discussion is purely academic at this point. Over the last two centuries, Congress has
crafted habeas and "All Writs" provisions that plainly authorize
the Court to grant the form of habeas relief that Bollman contemplated." Even though Bollman and subsequent legislation established original habeas as a potentially robust vehicle of appellate
jurisdiction over criminal confinement, the Court has not issued
such a writ since 1925. Why?
The answer involves the creation of viable appellate alternatives
to original habeas writs. A writ of error issues from an appellate
court to an inferior court that has entered a final judgment and directs the inferior court to send the record up so that the appellate
court may scrutinize it for error. The 1789 Judiciary Act authorized
the Supreme Court to issue writs of error only in civil matters," and
there was no mandatory (as-of-right) appeal in criminal cases
whatsoever.56 The 1789 Act did authorize the Court to issue the
common law writ of certiorari, but the common law certiorari writ
could only be used as a record-producing auxiliary to jurisdiction
already acquired. From a practical perspective, a contrary ruling
in Bollman-which would have eliminated original habeas authority-would have simply left the Court without any appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal confinement. After Bollman, the
writ's substantive scope was defined largely by its common law us-

" See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack
on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 2058-59 (1992) (observing the failure of § 14 to confer habeas power expressly, and that Bollman created
it); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 Duke L.J. 605, 627-32
(1970) (criticizing Bollman's statutory ruling on multiple fronts).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006) (All Writs provision); Id. § 2241(a) (2006) (organic
provision authorizing the Supreme Court to grant habeas writs). The All Writs provision authorizes federal courts to issue writs "necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." § 1651(a).
This language statutorily empowers courts to exercise powers implied by their creation. See Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 40-43 (1985).
" See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84; United States v. More, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 159, 170 (1805).
6 A right of appeal in admiralty and equity was added in 1803. See 2 Stat. 244
(1803).
1 See In re Chetwood, 165 U.S. 443,462 (1897).
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age and function at the time Congress enacted the 1789 legislation."
The 1867 Habeas Corpus Act did three things to expand the substantive scope of habeas relief available in Article III courts: (1) it
allowed a federal court to look beyond the written return (the
jailor's response) and to conduct its own fact-finding; (2) it permitted relief in any instance where a person's detention was in violation of federal law; and (3) it established relief for state prisoners. 9
At this historical juncture, both the Court's appellate jurisdiction
to issue original writs and federal courts' more general authority to
grant habeas relief were constitutionally maximal.' Moreover,
Congress had not yet enacted modern jurisdictional vehicles by
which the Supreme Court reviewed issues in criminal cases. The
period between Ex parte Lange (1874) and the Evarts Act (1891)the legislation that created the federal courts of appeal-might be
considered the high-water mark of original habeas jurisdiction."
During this period, the Court granted original habeas relief in at
least ten cases and received petitions in many more.62
" Statutory language authorizing original habeas relief did not change meaningfully
until 1867. In 1833, Congress authorized federal relief for state detention of federal
officers detained for acts undertaken "in pursuance of a law of the United States."
See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 67, §§ 3,7,4 Stat. 632,633-35.
See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, chs. 27-28, 14 Stat. 385.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 373-74 (1886) (reviewing the California Supreme Court's denial of habeas relief and finding the ordinances under which
the petitioner was detained to be unconstitutional); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,
247-53 (1886) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to
state prisoners when the imprisonment violates the Constitution); Ex parte Tom
Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883) (holding habeas corpus proceedings by a prisoner facing criminal prosecution to be civil in nature, governed in appellate jurisdiction questions by the statutes regulating civil proceedings, and thus reviewable by the Supreme
Court upon a certificate of division of opinion by circuit judges following a final
judgment); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868) (holding that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to revise an exercise of a lower federal court's
original jurisdiction, when the lower court decision imposes, affirms, or fails to modify
an unlawful detention); Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867)
(holding that the Act of Feb. 5, 1867 (the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867) provided the
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction to review constitutional questions presented by circuit court disposition of habeas petitions).
61See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (1891); Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Hertz & Liebman, supra note 25, § 2.4d, at
52-54.
'See In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 597
(1890); In re Savage, 134 U.S. 176, 177-78 (1890); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 174-75
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Several legislative events brought this era to a close. First, in
1885, Congress created an as-of-right appeal from district court habeas decisions.' Second, in 1891, Congress empowered the Supreme Court to conduct direct writ-of-error review in federal
criminal cases." Third, legislation in 1891 and 1925 codified the
statutory writ of certiorari, which established the Court's modern
discretionary jurisdiction over the decisions of lower courts.' As
Congress created appellate alternatives, the Supreme Court began
to fashion complementary prudential limits on original habeas relief. In a series of cases, the Court ruled that, other than in exceptional circumstances, it would not exercise habeas jurisdiction
where a writ of error was available.' By the middle of the twentieth century, original habeas had developed into a jurisdiction of
last resort-available to decide only those habeas cases for which
other appellate power was inadequate.
During the post-Civil War period of original habeas activity,'
one might have expected the Supreme Court to distinguish between limits on its Article III jurisdiction to revise use of the judicial power and limits on habeas relief common to all federal courts.
The Court, however, never answered that question. As the next
Section explains, the Court again failed to distinguish between the
two types of jurisdictional limits in its post-World War II military

(1890); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 221-22 (1888); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 14
(1887); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 726-27
(1885); Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 618 (1882).
3 Specifically (and among other things), the Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act
established certiorari jurisdiction over a narrow category of subject matter, and the
Judiciary Act of 1925 extended that jurisdiction to all cases in the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, §§ 237-40, 43 Stat. 936, 93739; Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. at 827-28; Act of Mar.
3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
' See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. at 827-28. Congress had actually created writ-of-error review for capital prisoners in 1889. See Act
of Feb. 6,1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656.
' See Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, §§ 237-40,43 Stat. 936, 937-39; Circuit Court of
Agpeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
See In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95, 100 (1895); In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211, 215 (1895).
Over time, the "exceptional circumstances" standard developed into a substantive
limit on all original habeas relief, irrespective of availability or mix of alternative appellate jurisdiction. See infra Subsection III.C.2.
67See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Hary. L. Rev. 441, 465-77 (1963).
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confinement cases. I discuss the importance of this trend-and
what it means for death penalty challenges-in Part III.'
C. Post-World War II Military Detention
After it lapsed as a preferred means of reviewing criminal confinement, original habeas resurfaced briefly as a potentially meaningful source of Supreme Court power over World War II military
detention.' The World War II military commission cases illustrate
this Part's two global themes. First, the cases illustrate the Court's
strong preference for alternatives to original habeas jurisdiction.
Second, the decisions-all of which denied relief-were invariably
phrased as limits common to federal courts generally, rather than
as limits on the Court's Article III appellate jurisdiction.
Understanding the full import of the World War II cases requires some understanding of the Supreme Court's review of military detention during the Civil War. In 1863, Ex parte Vallandigham rejected the Court's power to conduct direct certiorari
review of a Northern military commission that had sentenced a
Southern sympathizer.'o Vallandigham formally disclaimed only
certiorari, but the Court also suggested in dicta that it could not issue original habeas writs to accomplish that same review." Several
years later the Court refused to enforce that dicta as a holding,72
and the extent of its original habeas jurisdiction over military confinement remained unclear.
The next significant original habeas questions involving military
detention did not arise until World War II. Prior to 1948, the Supreme Court had granted review on the merits in only two military
detention cases, Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita." Quirin involved eight German-born men who had been living in the United
States before they returned to the German Reich between 1933
6 See infra Subsection III.E.2.
6 The discussion of military commissions could, conceptually speaking, belong in
Section I.A, supra, which discusses the Court's decisions involving whether the writ
can issue under the Court's Article 1I, § 2 appellate power. I treat the subject in this
separate Section because the relevant cases present unique and recurring issues that
are distinct from the issues the cases in the prior Section present.
7o68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 252-53 (1863).
Id. at 252.

n See Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 697 (1881).
' In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942).
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and 1941.74 After receiving explosives training, they were captured
trying to reenter the United States," tried by a presidentially convened secret military commission,7 and sentenced to death.' The
detainees were to be executed on a fairly short timetable, and all
officials involved preferred that the Court adjudicate the commission's legitimacy before capital punishment was actually imposed.
Quirin was first filed by seven of the eight detainees as an original habeas case, but, at the Court's behest, they perfected certiorari
jurisdiction between the first and second days of oral argument."
(One commentator has insightfully observed that "the Court's jurisdiction caught up with the Court just at the finish line."") The
detainees argued that the military trial was unconstitutional because it did not afford them protections specified in the Bill of
U.S. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
7 Id. at 22.
n Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson's Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin, 9
Green Bag 2d 223, 224 (2006). Roosevelt ultimately commuted two of the sentences.
Id.
' 8The Court's certiorari jurisdiction was not definitively established until after the
first day of oral argument, and not without considerable off-the-record back and forth
among the attorneys arguing the case, several of the Justices, and clerks in the lower
courts. 39 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Constitutional Law 498-504 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
[hereinafter Landmark Briefs]; Boris I. Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of Appeals: A Tale
of Nunc Pro Tunc Jurisdiction, 14 Const. Comment. 431, 440, 441 n.21 (1997). As of
the first day of argument, the saboteurs had made no appeal to the D.C. Circuit and
sought review in the Supreme Court only by original habeas. On that day Justice
Frankfurter made quite clear that he had problems with the notion that the Court had
appellate jurisdiction, even through original habeas, over matters not presented to the
relevant federal appeals court. Landmark Briefs, supra, at 498-99. Justice Jackson
suggested that the parties perfect the appeal by filing "an additional piece of paper"
(actually two). Id. at 504-06. Before the second day of argument, the saboteurs' lawyers filed documents to bring the case from the district court to the D.C. Circuit and a
certiorari petition to bring the case from the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court.
Bittker, supra, at 446. The D.C. Circuit clerk refused to accept, in place of the military
commission transcript, a copy of the record that had been prepared for the Supreme
Court proceeding. One of the saboteur's lawyers informed Chief Justice Stone of the
unanticipated clerical problem, and within an hour those lawyers were assured that
the clerk would accept the previously rejected record. Once the appropriate materials
were on file with the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court immediately granted certiorari.
Id. at 446-47.
" Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.-The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 Cornell
L.Q. 54, 58 (1942).
74317
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Rights.' The Court granted certiorari, denied the original writ, and
denied relief on the merits.' Quirin'sholding that Article I, Section
8, Clause 10 authorizes Congress to establish military commissions
punishing war crimes remains an important precedent for contemporary War on Terror ("WoT") cases.' Quirin is also important, at
least for my purposes, because it demonstrates the strength of the
Court's preference for certiorari petitions as a vehicle for appellate
review.
In re Yamashita involved an American military trial, conducted
in Manila, of a Japanese Imperial Army General accused of allowing his troops to commit atrocities against civilians and prisoners of
war." Yamashita was given a death sentence, and after Douglas
MacArthur and the Philippine Supreme Court both refused to
overturn it, he sought writs of certiorari, prohibition, and habeas
corpus in the U.S. Supreme Court.' The Court denied all three
writs, ruling on the merits that the Manila military commissions
had authority to hear the cases."
The Yamashita opinion remarked that "the military tribunals . .. are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject to review by this Court."' Some influential scholars think this
passage significant as to the reach of the Court's appellate jurisdiction,' but the wording of the entire paragraph in which that passage appears indicates that the Court was noting only that a habeas
writ (sought either before the Supreme Court or a district court)
does not function as a writ of error.' A narrower reading of Yamashita means that the Court again declined to distinguish between a
limit on original habeas jurisdiction common to all federal courts
and one specific to the Supreme Court's appellate authority to revise inferior use of the judicial power.

*Id. at 60-61.
8

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19.

a U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Quirin, 317 U.S.

at 26. For example, Quirin is important precedent in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 588-90 (2006), which concerns
the constitutionality of military commissions.
8 327 U.S. 1, 4-5, 14 (1946).
8 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 8 (citing Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 248, 251-53).
* See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 8, at 171.
See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8.
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Taken together, Quirin and Yamashita established that the military commissions could legitimately impose punishment, but neither case directly addressed the question of whether the judicial
power includes the jurisdiction to grant a habeas remedy.' In the
late 1940s, the Supreme Court received somewhere between 120
and 130 additional original petitions from military detainees who
failed to seek lower court habeas writs.' With slight variations, the
post-war Court was divided into two four-Justice camps. Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Burton, usually formed a block that voted to deny relief without argument for
want of appellate jurisdiction. Justices Black, Murphy, Rutledge,
and (usually) Douglas wanted argument on the jurisdictional question.91 Justice Jackson, who was the lead prosecutor at Nuremburg,
recused himself in all of the German cases.' Because the 4-4 results
effectively denied relief, Justice Jackson felt pressure to vote for
9 Quirin and Yamashita represent crucial precedent for WoT cases involving military commission authority, but those issues are distinct from the question of original
habeas jurisdiction. In fact, of the WoT cases, only Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 575-76 (2006), mentions the original writ, and only to note that it would be implicated in a Suspension Clause challenge the Court declined to reach.
' Oaks, supra note 8, at 171. Most did not pursue such relief because Ahrens v.
Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 192 (1948), held that prisoners confined in one district court's territorial jurisdiction could not seek habeas relief in another. The detainees seeking
original habeas but no lower court relief read Ahrens to hold more broadly that, because they were detained abroad and outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district
court, habeas relief was available only in original proceedings. A few years later the
Court concluded that, in light of both practical and legislative developments, Ahrens
was no longer good law. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 493-500 (1973). The post-Ahrens original petitions are nonetheless another example of how original habeas has historically operated as an important jurisdictional
vehicle of last resort.
" The pre-Hirotalineup can be observed throughout 1947 and 1948 cases. See, e.g.,
In re Heim, 335 U.S. 856 (1948); In re Eckstein, 335 U.S. 851 (1948); In re Hans, 335
U.S. 841 (1948); In re Wentzel, 335 U.S. 805 (1948); In re Gronwald, 334 U.S. 857
(1948); In re Ehlen, 334 U.S. 836 (1948); In re Girke, 334 U.S. 836 (1948); Everett v.
Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948); Becker-Freyseng v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948);
Beigelboeck v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Brack v. United States, 333 U.S.
836 (1948); Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Fischer v. United States, 333
U.S. 836 (1948); Gebhardt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Genzken v. United
States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Handloser v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Hoven v.
United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Mrugowsky v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948);
Rose v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Schroeder v. United States, 333 U.S. 836
(1948); Sievers v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Milch v. United States, 332 U.S.
789 (1947); see also Oaks, supra note 8, at 171.
' See 335 U.S. 876, 877, 879 (1948) (Jackson, J., accompanying memorandum).
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argument in original habeas proceedings sought by Pacific theatre
prisoners.93
94
In Hirota v. MacArthur,
Justice Jackson joined Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge to request oral argument on the
jurisdictional question.' Hirota was the former Japanese Premiere
and the named party in a joint petition filed by a number of Japanese prisoners sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, which was constituted by the Allied powers.' The per
curiam opinion states that "[u]nder the foregoing circumstances
the courts of the United States have no power" to scrutinize the
Japanese tribunal's sentences because the tribunal was not a U.S.
court.9 Hirota, then, is premised expressly on habeas limits common to all federal courts, and not on the limits of the Supreme
Court's Article III appellate jurisdiction to revise inferior exercise
of the judicial power.99

" See id. at 879-81 (Jackson, J., accompanying memorandum). Some have written
that whether the Supreme Court historically adhered to a rule of five or a rule of four
in determining whether to hear original habeas cases is unclear. See Ira P. Robbins,
Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four-Or Is It Five?, 36
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 6 n.27 (2002) (collecting periodical sources). I disagree with that
proposition. The post-World War II configurations strongly suggest that the Court
has always observed a rule of five on this issue.
'4338 U.S. 197 (1948).
" 335 U.S. at 881 (Jackson, J., accompanying memorandum). Justice Jackson took
no part in the decision itself, which denied relief. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion, Justice Murphy dissented, and Justice Rutledge reserved announcement
of his vote until a later time. Justice Rutledge passed away before he could announce
his vote. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198-99.

* Id. at 199 (Douglas, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 198.
* Reading Hirota as a categorical bar on lower or Supreme Court habeas review of
military commissions, however, no longer seems plausible. First, Hirota was decided
during an era in which Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)-which seemed to bar a
claimant from seeking habeas relief from a district court if he was not confined in that
court's territorial jurisdiction-was considered more of a jurisdictional than a prudential obstacle to habeas relief. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79 (2004); see also
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 499-500 (1973). The Court
and Congress rejected that understanding of Ahrens several years later. See discus-

sion supra note 90. Second, as early as 1950, even members of the Hirota majority appeared to regard that case as limited to the Far East military tribunal configuration. In
the final German case, Justice Black, who joined the per curiam opinion in Hirota,
voted to deny original habeas relief "without prejudice to making applications in a
District Court." In re Hans, 339 U.S. 976, 976 (1950).
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If the end of the nineteenth century also represented the end of
prolific original habeas review, then the World War II cases were a
retrenchment of sorts. Despite Vallandigham's suggestion that the
Supreme Court lacked original habeas jurisdiction to review military confinement directly, no case has formally imposed that restriction. Instead-as the World War II cases demonstrate-the
Court has historically preferred to style the jurisdictional limits it
does impose as limits on the judicial power common to all federal
courts, rather than as unique to its Article III appellate jurisdiction.
In short, the Supreme Court's authority to grant habeas relief is
roughly coextensive with the jurisdiction of lower courts to do so."
D. Modern Role of OriginalHabeasJurisdiction
Modern original habeas jurisdiction flows from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241," which is the general grant of habeas authority to federal
courts (and the descendant of the 1789 provision),"' as well as from
the All Writs provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1651.m An original writ has
not issued since 1925.2

In 1948, the Supreme Court acquired the

statutory authority to transfer an original habeas application to the
district court with territorial jurisdiction to hear it." The Court exercised that authority twice in 1962 and again in Davis.o' Most
modern discussion of the Court's Article III appellate jurisdiction
occurs in Suspension and Exceptions Clause cases involving a
lower court habeas disposition.
" In fact, there are at least two instances (both discussed in text that follows) where
the Supreme Court appears to consider its authority to grant habeas relief potentially
broader than that of lower courts. First, the habeas data show that the Supreme Court
withheld disposition of two Guantanamo petitions until it decided that federal district
courts had jurisdiction to entertain them. Only after it decided Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008), did it dismiss those petitions without prejudice to filing in district
court. See infra note 199. Second, the Supreme Court transferred the petition in Davis
even though, arguably, district courts do not have statutory authority to grant relief.
See 130 S. Ct. 1, 2-4 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 n.1 (1996).
.01
'02See infra Subsection III.D.2.
103

See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).

'0See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b).

" See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1; Byrnes v. Walker, 371 U.S. 937, 937 (1962); Chaapel v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 869, 869 (1962). Justice Douglas transferred a case in his capacity
as an individual Justice in 1973. See Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1973).
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Recall that Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution forbids Congress from suspending the privilege of habeas corpus." How the
original writ interacts with the Suspension Clause, however, has
not been explored by the Supreme Court.'" In Felker v. Turpin, the
leading modern original writ case (if there is such a thing), the
Court did consider a Suspension Clause question under its original
writ jurisdiction.'" The Court, however, merely used the original
writ as a procedural vehicle to scrutinize restrictions on successive
habeas petitions in lower courts.'" It did not consider whether the
availability of the original writ itself obviated Suspension Clause
concerns, nor did it indicate whether the Suspension Clause figured
prominently in its decision to insist on the original writ's availability.
Felker was really an Exceptions Clause case. As the data presented in Part II will show, most of the modern original habeas
docket consists of petitions challenging criminal confinement in
successive habeas proceedings. Successive petitions can contain
claims that are either successive (claims brought in a prior petition)
or abusive (claims that were not). The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") enacted particularly restrictive
rules for successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)."0 Under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), successive claims are categorically barred."'
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), abusive claims are also barred, with
two narrow exceptions."2 AEDPA's poor drafting is legendary,"'
and formalistic application of Section 2244(b)(1)-(2) is something
that the Court has repeatedly rejected."4
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld briefly commented on the relationship between the two, but
did not extensively consider the issue. See 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006).
518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996).
10

See id. at 664.

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21.
" See §2244(b)(1).
...
See § 2244(b)(2); see also infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing
content of two successive petition exceptions).
"' See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("[I]n a world of silk purses
and pigs' ears, the [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.").
114 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-44 (2007)
(holding that, if a term in
a statute is not self-defining, then you look to the prior successive petition law to determine its meaning); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998)
noAntiterrorism
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Section 2244(b) contains not only the substantive provisions applicable to successive petitions, but also the procedure by which
lower federal courts are to apply them."' Specifically, Section
2244(b)(3) provides for a "gatekeeping" or "authorization" system
under which applications for leave to file successive petitions must
be filed with an appeals court before a prisoner may proceed on
the merits of his petition in district court."6 If the appeals court determines that the prisoner has made a prima facie case for relief,
only then may he proceed with the litigation."' Under Section
2244(b)(3)(E), orders denying authorization to file the successive
petition may not be reviewed by appeal or by certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Felker contained three important legal holdings. First, the Supreme Court determined that AEDPA's provisions stripping its jurisdiction to review authorization denials did not apply to its original habeas power."' Second, the Court decided that the substantive
limits on successive petitions in Section 2244(b)(1) and (2) did not
constitute a suspension of the writ."' Third, the Court held that the
availability of original habeas pretermitted any controversy over
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provisions constituted an Excep-

tions Clause violation.120
Felker, together with AEDPA, created a new source of pressure
on the habeas docket. Before AEDPA, habeas relief was usually
sought only as an out-of-time certiorari petition. AEDPA stripped
the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction over orders denying authorization, however, and Felker established that prisoners could

(holding that certain types of numerically successive petitions are not barred under
§ 2244(b) because doing so would functionally punish diligent claimants).
".See § 2244(b)(3) (circuit courts); § 2244(b)(4) (district courts).
1".See § 2244(b)(3)(A).
"' See § 2244(b)(3)(C).
"

See Felker, 518 U.S. at 658.

"' See id. at 664.
120See id. at 661-62. I use the term "pretermit" because it is not clear whether, even
if § 2244(b)(3)(E) were held to strip the Court of original habeas jurisdiction, the provision might violate the Exceptions Clause. Under some Exceptions Clause theories,
Congress may strip all of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, but under other theories
(sometimes called "Essential Functions" theories) Congress must leave at least some
channels of Supreme Court review open. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying
text.
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seek original habeas as an alternative form of Supreme Court review.
II. ORIGINAL HABEAS DATASET ("OHD")

There is no prior data on the modern Supreme Court's original
habeas docket, in any form. Nobody has undertaken serious scrutiny of the procedure since Professor Dallin Oaks in 1962,121 and
even Professor Oaks did not appear to be working with data from a
single source.122 This Part reports, for the first time, the original habeas data I have collected. I refer to the reported data as the
"Original Habeas Dataset" or "OHD" for short. The OHD shows
that original habeas has transformed largely into a vehicle for litigating and deciding habeas claims presented in successive petitions.
A. OHD Study Design
The OHD consists of 1673 original habeas petitions, filed in the
twenty years between the Supreme Court's October 1988 and October 2007 terms. During this period, original habeas filings increased about tenfold.'" Approximately twenty-eight percent of
the petitions named the United States or an officer thereof as the
respondent, and sixty-nine percent of the petitions named a state
or its officer. The OHD dates back to the October 1988 term because, while I want to understand the change in original habeas activity over time generally, I am specifically interested in the post1996 effects of AEDPA and Felker.
1. Collection Methodology and Data Attributes
I compiled the OHD using materials previously stored in formats that made data acquisition, aggregation, and analysis difficult.
Many educational institutions retain microfiche copies of certain
Supreme Court filings, but those records usually include only certiorari pleadings and briefing in cases that the Court actually reviews. No electronic database has digitized copies of original habeas filings. Parties must ordinarily file forty copies of any pleading

'2

See Oaks, supra note 8.
See id. at 209-11 (appendix).

1"

See infra Table 1.

121

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 82 2011

2011

OriginalHabeas Redux

83

with the Court, 24 but the Supreme Court Rules relax this requirement if a party proceeds in forma pauperis ("ifp")-meaning without having to incur ordinary filing expenses (literally, "in the form
of a pauper").1" Because almost all original habeas claimants are

prisoners without financial resources, over ninety-five percent of
OHD prisoners proceed ifp, and they file only one copy of their
original petitions with the Court. That single original petition is assigned a 5000+ docket number, placed on the Court's Miscellaneous Docket, and ultimately routed to the National Archives in
Washington, D.C. The petition is almost never available in any
other location. 26
Due to security protocols at the National Archives building, I
created digital copies of the original petitions on site. After generating a digital library, I coded the petitions for a number of variables, including: docket number, Court Term, case name, date on
which the disposition issued, date on which the petition was filed,
whether it was filed ifp, whether the prisoner was in state or federal
custody, the type of prisoner (for example, criminally confined),
the respondent, the type of order issued by the last court to adjudicate the claim, whether the petitioners had sought or needed to
seek authorization to file a successive petition, whether the government filed a brief in opposition, whether the petitioner is a capital prisoner, and whether the petitioner was represented. Where
possible, I matched OHD entries with a petitioner's litigation history to confirm values for each variable. The OHD is not a sample;
it reports all petitions for the relevant period.
2. Self-Reporting Error
Before presenting the data, one source of error is worth explaining in greater detail. (I discuss the others in Section II.C.) "Selfreporting error" describes error associated with the flawed information that pro se prisoners provide in the original petitions themselves. There are virtually no authoritative accounts of any prisSee Sup. Ct. R. 20.2.

See Sup. Ct. R. 12.2, 20.2, 39.2, 39.5. In a very small fraction of cases (under six
percent in the OHD), the Supreme Court denies the ifp petition before dismissing the
habeas claims. See Sup. Ct. R. 39.8.
'"These file copies are usually described as "original" filings, but I avoid referring
to "originals" of "original petitions" in the obvious interest of clarity.

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 83 2011

84

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:61

oner's procedural history, so OHD coding reflects the failure of
some prisoners to state that material honestly, accurately, or precisely. Where possible, I verified or reconciled self-reported material with more reliable information, but much self-reporting error
remains.12
Self-reporting error affects the coding of a petition's substantive
and procedural attributes. The effect on substantive attribute coding is more pronounced, but the content of the petitions' underlying constitutional claims is not this Article's primary emphasis.12
The most important procedural variables compromised by selfreporting error are: (1) the type of order issued by the last court to
adjudicate the claim, and (2) whether the petitioner sought or
needed to seek authorization to file a successive petition (together,
the "Affected Variables"). 29
Although self-reporting error is unavoidable, it should not significantly affect the variously aggregated results that Section II.B
reports-even for the Affected Variables. For individual entries
that rely on Affected Variables, figures are unlikely to be off by
more than a percentage point or two. The general trends that form
the basis for my analysis in Part III are almost certainly unaffected.
B. OHD Results
Table 1 reports the number of habeas petitions filed per term,
for each OHD year. Original habeas activity during the October
2007 term was over ten times that of the October 1988 term. Because of the date parameters, petitioners in the OHD received no
original habeas relief of any kind-either in the form of an original
127Depending on the variable, self-reporting might account for either type I (false
positive) or type II (false negative) error. I do not extensively discuss the incidence of
each error type in the body of this Article.
" Fully correcting for self-reporting error in substantive attribute coding is almost
impossible, and any serious effort to minimize it will require considerable resources.
Massive evidentiary and conceptual difficulties inhere in determining what a prisoner's original habeas claim "really" is, and resolving those problems is beyond my
ambition here.
12 The variables for which self-reporting error is probably insignificant are: docket
number, Court term, case name, date on which the disposition issued, date on which
the petition was filed, whether it was filed ifp, whether the prisoner was in state or
federal custody, the respondent, whether the government filed a brief in opposition,
whether the petitioner is a capital prisoner, and whether the petitioner was represented.
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writ or in the form of an order transferring the proceedings to district court for further determination. All instances of original habeas relief either pre- or post-date the OHD.'m
The OHD is a vast source of information about the original habeas docket, but I limit myself to the observations most important
to the capital safety valve paradigm I discuss in Part III. First,
criminally confined prisoners generate almost all original habeas
activity. Second, among criminally confined prisoners, state prisoners account for roughly two-thirds of that activity. Third, legal representation is limited almost exclusively to capital proceedings,
with the exceptions usually occurring in WoT cases. Fourth, the
majority of original petitions are successive.
Table 1: Summary by Year

October Term
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989

Total

Federal

State

Petitions

Prisoners

Prisoners

145
113
131
105
123
133
100
130
137
113
89
72
75
35
40
35
30
30
23

51
31
52
23
35
50
31
34
21
30
18
18
6
9
8
10
9
7
14

93
79
74
77
85
80
68
93
112
83
66
48
69
24
28
24
20
22
7

Otheri..
1
3
5
5
3
3
1
3
4
0
5
8
0
2
4
1
1
1
2

See cases cited supra note 105.
"Other" usually refers to petitions that do not challenge confinement, but it also
includes some docket entries for which a file or other data are missing.
131
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1988
Totals (%)

9
69.4%

4
27.5%

14
100%

[Vol. 97:61
1
3.1%

1. Habeas Activity by Type of Confinement
The types of prisoners seeking the original writ in the Supreme
Court should be the same types of prisoners seeking habeas relief
generally. Historically, this group includes military detainees,
aliens subject to exclusion and deportation orders in immigration
cases, and prisoners subject to criminal confinement.132 For a variety of reasons, however, these categories of prisoners do not seek
original habeas relief in the same proportions that they seek habeas relief in district court.
In the OHD, over ninety-six percent of original habeas activity
involves prisoners confined by order of either a state or federal
court. Since the beginning of the WoT, a small fraction (under one
percent) of original habeas petitions have been filed by military detainees. The OHD contains even fewer petitions filed in immigration proceedings. Table 2 presents the number of habeas petitions
in the OHD, by year and by type of confinement. Because the
OHD shows that original petitions are filed almost exclusively by
criminally confined prisoners, Part III analyzes a framework for
adjudicating petitions in that context.
Table 2: Type of Confinement by Year
October Term

2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
132

Total
Petitions

Criminal
Confinement

145
113
131
105
123
133
100
130
137

141
108
125
100
118
129
99
126
133

Military
Confinement

3
1
1
0
2
0
0
0
0

See cases cited supra note 29.
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0
0
0
0
3
1
0
1
0

1
4
5
5
0
3
1
3
4
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1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
Totals (%)

113
89
72
75
35
40
35
30
30
23
14
100%

113
81
71
75
33
35
34
29
29
21
13
96.4%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.4%

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.4%

0
8
1
0
2
4
1
1
1
2
1
2.8%

2. CriminalPost-ConvictionActivity by Type of Petitioner
The group of criminally confined petitioners subdivides into
state and federal prisoners. In the OHD, state prisoners constitute
about seventy percent of the criminally confined original habeas
petitioners, and federal prisoners constitute about thirty percent. 133
A criminally confined state prisoner usually invokes 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 to challenge a conviction or sentence, and a criminally confined federal prisoner usually invokes Section 2255.'" While both
state and federal prisoners seeking original habeas generally will
have completed direct review of their convictions, state prisoners
must also exhaust all available state post-conviction remedies before seeking original habeas relief.3 1
Table 3 reports, by year and for criminally confined offenders,
the number of original habeas petitions filed by state and federal
prisoners. Depending on the year, state prisoners file somewhere
between two and four times the number of original petitions that
These percentages are slightly different than the percentages reported in Table 1
because the data that Table 2 describes do not include WoT detainees, aliens subject
to exclusion or removal, and any other prisoners that are not criminally sentenced.
mAs explained supra note 27, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 describes a remedy that is not technically denominated "habeas corpus" but is functionally almost identical to the writ.
Also, there are certain instances where a prisoner may invoke only § 2241, including
when a prisoner argues under § 2255(e) that the remedy for federal prisoners is "inadequate or ineffective" to test custody, or when a prisoner challenges a parole determination. These scenarios are not important to my analysis. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) (2006).
133

m See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
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federal petitioners file. The volume of federal prisoner litigation is
nonetheless significant enough that the paradigm Part III presents
need not involve distinctions based on which sovereign imposes
criminal confinement.
Table 3: Criminal Confinement by Sovereign and by Year
October Term

2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
Totals

Total Criminally State Criminally
Confined
Confined
Petitioners
Petitioners
93
141

108
125
100
118
129
99
126
133
113
81
71
75

33
35

34
29
29
21
13
100%

79
74

77
85
80
68
93

112
83
66
48
69
24
28
24
20
22
7
9
72.0%

Federal Criminally Confined
Petitioners

48
29
51
23
33
49
31
33
21
30
15

23
6
9
7
10
9
7
14
4
28.0%

3. Representationand CapitalProceedings

Nine percent of the criminally confined prisoners in the OHD attack capital sentences. Of the criminally confined prisoners attacking capital sentences, almost ninety-five percent were represented
by counsel.' 6 By contrast, only about two percent of criminally con" The ones that were not represented had usually chosen to proceed pro se after
declining representation.
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fined, noncapital prisoners had lawyers. The disparity between
capital and noncapital representation reflects the difference in appointment-of-counsel rules for petitioners attacking a death sentence.'37
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), any capital, criminally confined
offender that is financially incapable of procuring representation is
entitled to appointment of counsel in federal habeas proceedings,"
and counsel's responsibilities are specified partially in Subsection
(e). Those responsibilities include representation at "every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including ... all
available post-conviction process." 39 Capital prisoners seeking
original habeas relief are entitled to representation both because
the original petition is itself a Section 2254 or Section 2255 attack
on a death sentence under Section 3599(a)(2),'" and because it is a
"subsequent stage of ... post-conviction process" under Section
3599(e).'4 1
There is no express statutory right to counsel for noncapital
prisoners seeking original habeas relief. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A,
the "interests of justice" can entitle a prisoner to appointment of
counsel in district court habeas proceedings, but there is no similar
provision applicable to Supreme Court original habeas petitions.
The absence of a statutory counsel requirement is the reason that
noncapital prisoners almost always appear pro se.'42 Table 4 reports, by year and for criminally confined prisoners, the breakdown
among: pro se capital petitioners, represented capital petitioners,
pro se noncapital petitioners, and represented noncapital petitioners. Legal representation for death-sentenced prisoners is an important element of the capital safety valve paradigm that I describe
in Part III.

'I specify that these are "criminally imposed" death sentences because military
commissions may also capitally sentence defendants.
' See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2).
1' § 3599(e); see also Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1484-85 (2009) ("We conclude that a COA is not necessary and that § 3599 authorizes federally appointed
counsel to represent clients in state clemency proceedings.").
" § 3599(a)(2).
141§ 3599(e).
141Perhaps because of the high-profile nature of the cases,
WoT detainees are the
exception to this rule, and all appearing in the OHD had counsel.
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Table 4: Criminally Confined Prisoners by Capital and Pro Se
Status and by Year

October
Term

2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
Totals (%)

RepreProse
Crimisented
Capital
nally
Confined Prisoners Capital
Prisoners
Prisoners

141
108
125
100
118
129
99
126
133
113
82
71
75
33
35
34
29
29
21
13
100%

0
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.5%

5
6
14
8
9
21
19
15
29
25
21
24
2
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
12.4%

Pro se
Noncapital
Prisoners

134
98
108
88
108
106
77
108
103
82
54
45
73
33
33
34
28
29
20
11
84.5%

Represented
Noncapital
Prisoners

2
2
2
3
1
2
3
2
1
5
7
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
2.1%

4. Successive Petitions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3)

Original habeas is, by far, most frequently sought to litigate
claims in successive habeas petitions. The OHD shows that over
half of original petitioners are seeking to bypass successive petition
requirements, including over eighty percent of reported capital
prisoners.
As previously mentioned, the Section 2244(b) successive petition
provisions apply almost identically to criminally confined state and
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federal petitioners' Section 2244(b) contains both substantive
standards and procedures for adjudicating successive petitions.
Sections 2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) set forth the substantive standards.
Section 2244(b)(1) requires that any claim presented in a prior habeas petition (any successive claim) be dismissed." Section
2244(b)(2) requires that any claim not presented in a prior petition
(any abusive claim) be dismissed, with two exceptions.145 First, a
prisoner may litigate an abusive claim that was previously unavailable and that relies on a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review."
Second, a prisoner may litigate an abusive claim if its factual predicate could not have been previously discovered through due diligence, and if those facts establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror would find the petitioner guilty.1' Because
AEDPA largely codified common law successive petition rules,
there is considerable debate over how flexibly the statutory rules
may be interpreted."
Section 2244(b)(3) and (4) set forth the trial and appellate procedures for deciding successive petitions. Section 2244(b)(3) requires that an appeals panel authorize any successive litigation before it proceeds' and states that litigation is authorized only when
a petitioner makes a prima facie showing under Section

The terms of § 2244 are facially applicable only to § 2254 claims by state prisoners, but § 2255(h) makes § 2244 applicable to successive claims made by federal prisoners. See §§ 2244, 2255(h).
'4 § 2244(b)(1).
145 § 2244(b)(2).
'1 § 2244(b)(2)(A).
§§42244(b)(2)(B).
'See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-44 (2007) (stating that the
meaning of § 2244(b) "is not self-defining" and "takes its full meaning from" the
Court's pre-AEDPA abusive petition law); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting a literalist interpretation of § 2244(b) and agreeing with other
courts that the interpretation of the provision "involves the application of the preAEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles"); see also Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 342 (1993) ("Despite this statutory guidance, the
Court's approach to 'successive' and 'abusive' petitions likewise has been fashioned
without close attention to statutory language.... [B]oth the Warren and the
Rehnquist Courts designed their own substantive standards governing such petitions
wholly apart from statutory language.").
"§§ 2244(b)(3)(A)-(B).
14
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2244(b)(2)'s substantive provisions." Section 2244(b)(4) requires
that a district court dismiss any claim that does not satisfy any part
of Section 2244, even if it appears in a petition that the appellate
court authorized.' Insofar as original habeas authority is concerned, the crucial procedural provision appears in Section
2244(b)(3)(E): "The grant or denial of an authorization by a court
of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing
or for a writ of certiorari."'52 This provision is what creates the extraordinary demand for original habeas review of successive claims
that I discuss in Part III.
Section 2244(b)(3)(E)'s bar on certiorari review of authorization
denials has spawned two broad categories of jurisdictional litigation: whether certain chronologically subsequent federal habeas
petitions are to be treated as statutorily successive,m and when the
Supreme Court may exercise non-certiorari power over orders denying authorization.154 I do not concern myself with the former
category here, except to note generally that the Court frequently
opts for plausibly narrow readings of the term "successive" in order to allow more robust certiorari review.' I focus instead on the
second category of cases-those dealing with the conditions under
which the Court may exercise non-certiorari jurisdiction. The leading case is Felker v. Turpin, discussed briefly in Section I.D.
Felker held that: (1) Section 2244(b)(3)(E) did not strip the Court's
non-certiorari authority over authorization denials;. (2) because
the Court retained original habeas authority, AEDPA did not unconstitutionally restrict Article III, Section 2 appellate power over
"§ 2244(b)(3)(C).
§ 2244(b)(4).
152 § 2244(b)(3)(E).
" See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 942; Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 380-81 (2003);
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-44 (1998).
' See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1996).
See cases cited supra note 153.
* 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
'

* Id. at 658-61. The Court actually invoked Ex parte Yerger for the proposition that
it will generally not consider original habeas jurisdiction repealed without an express
statutory directive to that effect. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105-06
(1869). Recall that in Yerger, the Court had determined that the 1867 and 1868 Habeas Acts did not effect a restriction on the original habeas authority that the 1787
Judiciary Act created. Id. at 106.
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the relevant habeas dispositions;' (3) the Section 2244(b)(3) gatekeeping procedure did not apply to original habeas cases;' and (4)
the substantive standards applicable to abusive and successive
claims did not violate the Suspension Clause.
The Court's ability to review issues presented by successive petitions is crucial for several reasons. First, powerful and previously
unavailable DNA evidence is frequently invoked for the first time
in successive habeas petitions. The DNA issue is particularly salient in petitions filed by capital prisoners, around five percent of
which are terminated as successive.m Second, new and retroactive
capital eligibility rules, such as the Atkins v. Virginia bar on executing mentally retarded offenders," are frequently the bases for
claims in successive petitions. Third, a vehicle for reviewing Section 2244(b) gateway determinations ensures that the Court can
control how the gateway rules are themselves interpreted. Part III
expands on the importance of original habeas jurisdiction over
capital sentences, particularly in successive federal habeas litigation.
Table 5 shows, by year and confining authority, the number of
original petitions that effectively seek review of successive or abusive claims. Because Table 5 presents an Affected Variable, it is
probably prone to some small "type-II" error-the OHD underreports the number of original petitions with this procedural history. As Subsection II.A.2 explains, many pro se prisoners likely
failed to understand or to precisely recount authorization proceedings. The magnitude of self-reporting error is unlikely to vary as
between state and federal prisoners. For all of the OHD that postdates AEDPA, over half of the docket entries involved successive

" 518 U.S. at 661-62.

Id. at 662-63.
* Id. at 663-64. The Court also denied relief on the merits. Id. at 665.
See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
162Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation
in U.S. District
Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 47 (2007),
httg://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).
See infra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
161
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petitions. The OHD shows that this successive litigation is, by a
wide margin, the largest factor driving the explosion in original habeas filings.
Perhaps the most important piece of information relating to the
OHD appearing in Table 5 involves the capital composition of the
original habeas petitions attempting to bypass restrictions on successive habeas litigation. Over eighty percent of petitions filed by
capital prisoners seek to bypass authorization proceedings. The
number of death penalty cases that are otherwise the subject of unreviewable orders underscores the importance of the capital safety
valve paradigm I discuss in Part III.
Table 5: Criminal Confinement by
October
Term

2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
Totals
(%

Authorization
CrimiTotal
Aunally
thorizaContion
fined
Bypass
Offenders

Bypass and by Year
Total
Federal State
Capital Capital Capital
Offend- Offend- Offenders
ers
ers

141
108
125
100
118
129
99
126
133
113
82
71
100%

5
8
15
9
9
21
19
16
29
26
21
25
15.1%

53
59
62
54
57
73
41
97
75
79
66
35
55.8%

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0.1%

5
8
15
9
9
20
19
15
29
26
21
25
14.9%

Capital
Authorization
Bypass

2
6
13
6
9
17
11
16
22
21
19
19
12.0%

)1661

1 Coding for "involved successive petitions" was more of an art than a science. This
category includes petitioners that either sought authorization or appeared to avoid an
authorization proceeding because it would have been futile.
" The percentages in this row use the period's sum of criminally confined offenders
as the denominator.

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 94 2011

OriginalHabeas Redux

2011

95

C. OHD Errorand Subsequent Research Needs
The OHD contains information about the Supreme Court's
original habeas jurisdiction that is not available from any other
source. The set of variables for which I coded the petitions was
nonetheless limited in some important respects. I described the
most important problem with the data-self-reporting error-in
Subsection II.A.2. I specify five other important limitations below.
First, the OHD contains no entries for which any relief was
granted. As a result, no regression analysis can show what attributes predict relief. The Supreme Court exercised its authority to
transfer a petition in In re Davis,' but that data point is outside the
OHD's date parameters. Moreover, even if the Davis result were
part of the OHD, there would need to be more instances where relief was obtained (the dependent variable) before meaningfully assessing how different attributes of the original petitions (the independent variables) affect outcomes. Subsequent work may address
this problem by extending OHD date parameters to include more
instances where the Court granted some sort of relief."
Second, I was unable to code many attributes of the substantive
claims presented in the petitions. By "substantive claim," I mean
the underlying constitutional violation that the claim invokes. I was
able to divide the claims up in certain ways-such as those in capital versus noncapital cases-but the classifications I was able to
make were generally evident from the docket, and I was not forced
to code them by interpreting the contents of the original habeas petition itself. The OHD does not describe, for example, the number
of prisoners with claims that they were convicted in violation of
some procedural rule, such as that in Brady v. Maryland (prosecution unconstitutionally withholding evidence)' or Strickland v.
Washington (constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel),"o or
sentenced in violation of a capital eligibility standard, such as that
in Atkins v. Virginia (prohibition on execution of mentally retarded
offenders)."' The OHD does not even distinguish between peti1'

130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).

'6'The incidence of relief would have to be considerably higher before the problem
is effectively addressed.
16' 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
17 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
M536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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tions that contain so-called "freestanding" claims of actual innocence from petitions that contain claims of innocence alongside
some other constitutional challenge.172 Self-reporting error simply
made it too difficult to extend the scope of this Article to include
these classifications. Subsequent work can build on the OHD by
coding reliable information about the underlying content of original habeas claims.
Third, the OHD does not reflect coding for many categories of
lower court orders that usually precede habeas relief. The last orders issued prior to the filing of a habeas petition are, generally
speaking, effectively the orders for which original habeas petitioners seek Supreme Court review. Once again, self-reporting error
made this information too difficult to collect. Of course, the OHD
does reflect the presence of a Section 2244(b)(3) order denying authorization, but lower court relief can be denied in any number of
other procedural postures. In order to reliably acquire and tabulate
this information, subsequent work will have to cross-reference the
names of original habeas petitioners with other state and federal
dockets to determine what a last prior order actually did." 3 Moreover, this information is necessary to understand how many prisoners are using original habeas only because their certiorari petitions would be time-barred.'74
Fourth, subsequent work must link the date variables with other
data points to make that information more meaningful. Specifically, the length during which categories of original habeas petitions are pending is important, but that information is not worth
For a discussion of freestanding innocence, see infra Subsection III.E.2.
".Again, the original petitions themselves do not reliably report the procedural history, and subsequent analysis would benefit from data regarding whether it issued
from a state or federal court and-if it issued from a federal court-whether the issuing entity is a district or appeals court. For last prior orders from federal courts, other
important attributes not described in the OHD include whether a certificate of appealability has been granted and whether the lower court disposition rested on a procedural ruling such as the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court Rules instruct
original habeas petitioners to include prior opinions as appendices to their petitions,
but the Court cannot possibly know whether they are in fact omitted. See Sup. Ct. R.
20.2, 14.1(i).
174This was in fact one of the main reasons for using original habeas procedure prior
to AEDPA. Prisoners generally have ninety days, measured from the date of the last
prior order, to file certiorari petitions. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. There is no corresponding
time limit on seeking an original habeas writ. See Sup. Ct. R. 20.
12
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reporting without cross-tabulations that I cannot construct with existing variables. Simply computing the average number of days between when petitions were filed and denied is not helpful. For
starters, the OHD does not mark which petitions were pending
during the Supreme Court's recess, and those petitions take longer
to adjudicate. Moreover, information regarding the time to dispose
of capital challenges is far more useful when not reported as an average. To be meaningful, an average capital disposition time should
be grouped by whether a prisoner requests habeas relief alongside
a motion to stay an execution."' The OHD, however, does not contain data on stay motions. Subsequent researchers can acquire such
information fairly easily by cross-referencing the names of original
habeas petitioners with prisoners seeking stays.
Fifth, the OHD does not contain comprehensive information
about how the Supreme Court treated any original habeas petitions
internally."' The famous secrecy with which the Court and its
Clerk's Office guard internal rules prevents the public from understanding certain aspects of original habeas decisionmaking. For example, the OHD does not have a variable that marks whether an
original habeas petition, which is addressed formally to a single
Justice riding circuit in the jurisdiction of confinement, was referred to the Court as a whole. As a matter of practice, individual
Justices almost always refer original petitions to the Court, although there is no publicly available information about whether
the unanimity of referral protocol is imposed by rule or is a courtesy separately observed by nine different chambers."' The secrecy
of internal protocol renders certain procedural events more difficult to recognize, but the passage of time might make these
events-even for petitions currently in the OHD-easier for sub'" Because original relief sought in conjunction with stays takes only a day or two to
decide (capital prisoners usually seek stays at the eleventh hour), and because I
strongly suspect original petitions attacking capital sentences but not filed in conjunction with a stay take longer to adjudicate, an average pendency would reside near the
bottom of U-shaped distribution for which the extremes are far more important.
"The major exception involves internal votes disclosed in the Blackmun Papers,
which are now accessible online. See Lee Epstein et al., Digital Archive of the Papers
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/blackA. Blackmun,
Harry
of Justice
mun.php?p=O. To my knowledge, however, these papers do not disclose the internal
clerk's rules themselves.
'" Justice Douglas was an exception to this rule. See, e.g., Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S.
1327, 1327 (1973).
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sequent researchers to mark with variables. Inferences about otherwise unpublished procedural rules become stronger over time
because the Court must occasionally disclose internal treatment to
make or dispute certain rulings. For example, although there is no
published rule on the subject, several dissents have made clear that
the modern Court continues to adhere to the Hirota-erarule that
five votes are required to even hear a case under its original habeas
authority."' (Certiorari requires only four." ' )
Despite these real limitations, the OHD is, by orders of magnitude, the most useful source of information about original habeas
petitions. As my discussion of each limitation indicates, there is
considerable room for subsequent research to both expand and refine the data. I now turn to the question of what, in light of the
OHD, the modern Supreme Court can, should, and will do with its
original habeas power to review criminal confinement.
III. OHD IMPLICATIONS: A CAPITAL SAFETY VALVE PARADIGM

If original habeas relief has historically been used to review
claims over which other appellate jurisdiction was lacking (as Part I
argues), and if successive petitions now dominate the Supreme
Court's original habeas docket (as Part II reports), then one would
predict original habeas authority to be exercised in at least one of
the eighty percent of OHD capital petitions that seeks to bypass
Section 2244(b). Indeed, that is exactly what In re Davis did." In
this Part, I make both a normative and a positive argument: that
Davis should not and is unlikely to remain an isolated occurrence.
New questions about capital proceedings combine with severe restrictions on ordinary habeas review to create an environment in
which the Court may increasingly lean on its original habeas
power's jurisdictional, substantive, and remedial features in order

See Robbins, supra note 93, at 2-5 (discussing In re Tarver, 528 U.S. 1152 (2000)).
" See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in
American Politics 211 (5th ed. 2000); Robbins, supra note 93, at 13 nn.69-72; accord
In re Smith, 526 U.S. 1157 (1999) (three dissenting Justices voting to set the matter for
full briefing); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (four dissenting Justices voting for
argument).
130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
'"
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to avoid wrongful executions. In the interest of brevity, I describe
this cluster of concepts as the "capital safety valve paradigm."
A. Davis and Successive Petitions
The Supreme Court neither granted nor transferred an original
habeas petition within the OHD date parameters. In the summer
of 2009, however, Davis ended the era of original habeas inactivity."' The State of Georgia convicted and capitally sentenced Troy
Davis for murdering an off-duty police officer." Davis had been
arrested after a highly publicized manhunt." After his conviction
became final,'" Davis unsuccessfully filed a state habeas petition
alleging that another man, Sylvester "Redd" Coles, was the
shooter.' Davis petitioned for federal habeas relief alleging that
the prosecution failed to disclose material, exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland; that the prosecution failed to disclose witness impeachment evidence in violation of Giglio v.
United States;" and that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington." The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined that Davis's claims
were procedurally defaulted.'" After moving unsuccessfully for a
new trial in state court, Davis sought Section 2244(b)(3) authorization to file a successive federal petition in which he would make a
"freestanding" innocence claim." The Eleventh Circuit denied au-

18Id.
182 See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844, 845-46 (Ga. 1993).
8 See Ellis Cose, Actual Innocence: A Death-Row Case Tests Whether Swift Justice Can Also Be Certain, Newsweek, June 18, 2009, http:// www.newsweek.com/
2009/06/17/actual-innocence.html.
'" See Davis, 426 S.E.2d at 845.
'8 See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6-7, Davis v. Head, No. 4:01-cv-00290
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 14,2001).
'8 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 19, Davis v.
Head, No. 4:01-cv-00290 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2001) (stating Brady claim).
..405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); see also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 19,
Davis v. Head, No. 4:01-cv-00290 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2001) (stating Giglio claim).
"8 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 18, 37,
Davis v. Head, No. 4:01-cv-00290 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2001) (stating Strickland claim).
" Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).
"For readers unfamiliar with the definition of a "freestanding" innocence claim,
Subsection III.C.1, infra, explains.
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thorization." Davis then filed for original habeas relief, requesting
that the Supreme Court transfer his petition to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia.1
In his Supreme Court pleading, Davis argued that exceptional
circumstances warranted the exercise of original habeas jurisdiction, that the Eleventh Circuit erred in denying authorization, that
the state decision denying relief was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), and that executing him without an evidentiary hearing
would raise "serious constitutional issues.""' All of these positions
relied heavily on post-trial affidavits in which seven of nine eyewitnesses recanted their testimony and in which at least two other
people implicated Coles as the shooter. Coles himself was one of
the two non-recanting witnesses fingering Davis. Almost all of the
State's case against Davis was based on eyewitness testimony, with
a single shell casing-connected to a gun that the police never
found-offered as the only physical evidence that Davis was the
shooter.94 in response, the State argued that the original habeas
petition was an impermissible substitute for a certiorari petition,
that exceptional circumstances did not warrant relief, and that
adequate state remedies had been available.
The Supreme Court granted the transfer in a one-paragraph
opinion." Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
concurred in the judgment.'" The concurrence primarily engaged
Justice Scalia's dissent, which Justice Thomas joined and which argued that the transfer was a fool's errand because the district court
could not grant relief on a freestanding innocence claim. 98 Davis
provides a useful framework to consider the original habeas writ's
role in capital proceedings. More specifically, Davis demonstrates:
(1) that the Court is unlikely to observe anything other than express statutory limits on its original habeas jurisdiction; (2) that peIn re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 2009).
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (No. 081443).
' Id. at 28.
* Id. at 15.
"' Brief in Opposition on Behalf of Respondent at 21, 28-30, In re Davis, 130 S. Ct.
1 (2009) (No 08-1443).
In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
See id. at 1-2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19 See id. at 2-4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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titions attacking capital sentences fare well under substantive standards the Court applies in the exercise of that jurisdiction; and (3)
that the transfer remedy is uniquely suited to the fact-intensive inquiries that wrongful execution claims present. I now consider each
of these phenomena in turn.
B. The Persistence of OriginalHabeasJurisdiction
The resilience of the Supreme Court's original habeas authority
is remarkable. That power is likely to remain a uniquely important
means of adjudicating challenges to criminal confinement largely
because of the way Congress configures and the Court interprets
restrictions on the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Original habeas
relief is not necessary where certiorari jurisdiction allows the Court
to review the underlying claim, and criminal confinement is one of
the only contexts in which Congress has limited the Court's certiorari authority.' Indeed, when a prisoner files an original habeas
petition but is eligible to seek a writ of certiorari, the Court will

'" Both appeals under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, and from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are now
subject to certiorari review. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1259 (2006); see also Brief for
the Respondents in Opposition to the Petitions for Rehearing at 6, Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196) (stating that the Government
would not challenge Supreme Court jurisdiction in DTA cases because certiorari review was available). There is therefore no routine need for original habeas jurisdiction in most military detainee cases. In one unusual instance, however, a detainee had
sought an original writ, and the Government opposed in part on the ground that the
Supreme Court lacked authority to issue such relief. See Motion to Dismiss at 7, In re
Ali, 128 S. Ct. 2954 (2008) (No. 06-1194). After withholding disposition on the petition for well over a year, the Court dismissed it without prejudice to the detainee's
ability to seek relief in district court. In re Ali, 128 S. Ct. 2954 (2008); see also In re
Al-Ghizzawi, 128 S. Ct. 2954 (2008) (No. 07-6827) (dismissed on the same day and
under the same conditions as Ali). The impetus for dismissing the petition was almost
certainly the decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008), which held
that Guantanamo detainees could seek habeas relief in district court. The fact that the
Court withheld disposition on the Ali petition until Boumediene suggests that the
Court might have been willing to consider the availability of original habeas proceedings had it determined that district courts lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ. The potential use of the original writ in detainee cases appears to involve instances where a
petitioner is held without any process, civil or military. Three members of the Court
also suggested that an original writ may be appropriate in instances where the Government deliberately frustrates certiorari jurisdiction by shifting a prisoner's custodian. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, J.).
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simply treat the original habeas pleading as a misnamed certiorari

petition.20
A scenario under which the Court would exercise its original habeas power in lieu of its certiorari jurisdiction is difficult to imagine
because of the number of votes each type of relief requires. A certiorari writ may issue upon receiving the votes of four Justices, but
an original habeas writ requires five (and involves a more onerous
substantive standard).20 ' Original habeas is so important as a means
of reviewing criminal confinement because the Court retains unfettered certiorari jurisdiction over all other types of habeas claims.
Subsection II.B.2 reported that criminally confined offenders now
account for over ninety-eight percent of original habeas activity.
Moreover, Congress has typically been unable or unwilling to
strip original habeas authority. Recall that in Ex parte Bollman, the
Court adopted-over Justice Johnson's powerful dissent-an interpretation of the 1789 Act that affirmed its statutory authority to
hear original habeas petitions.20 In Ex parte Yerger, the Court rejected an interpretation of an 1868 statute that would have stripped
its original habeas power generally, instead reading the statute as
repealing only original habeas authority granted in 1867 legislation.203 Yerger is also the source of a strong presumption against
implied jurisdiction stripping, rejecting the argument that the 1867
statute's jurisdictional grant implicitly repealed the authority the
1789 Act created.2' The Court's tendency to ignore all but the most
express limits on its original habeas jurisdiction remains pronounced in the modern era, as Felker v. Turpin held that such
power persists over authorization orders even though AEDPA
provides that they "shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition for . . . writ of certiorari."'

The animating logic of these cases runs the gamut of legal analysis, from practical necessity to constitutional avoidance. Bollman's
statutory ruling, for example, seems largely driven by the practical
need to ensure that the Supreme Court could issue the same writs
m See, e.g., Dennett v. Hogan, 414 U.S. 12, 13 (1973) (per curiam).
a' See Gressman et al., supra note 2, at 664.
' See 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100-01 (1807).
2.. See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103-06 (1869).
. See id. at 105.
2 518 U.S. 651, 651, 660-61 (1996).
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as could judges, inferior courts, and the Justices in their individual
capacities. 20 Yerger expressed a similar emphasis on Court supremacy, as well as the aforementioned presumption against repeals by
implication.2' In holding that AEDPA did not strip original habeas
jurisdiction over authorization orders, Felker established that nineteenth-century presumptions regarding original habeas jurisdiction
remain viable today.208
Felker also suggests a jurisdiction-preserving principle of a more
modern vintage, which involves the Exceptions Clause. Although
the "traditional" view of the Exceptions Clause was that Congress's authority to limit the Court's jurisdiction was plenary,2 in
the mid- to late twentieth century a number of federal courts theorists argued that Congress could not eliminate all forms of the
Court's appellate jurisdiction.210 Felker took no formal position on
the issue, although the parties extensively briefed it.211 The Exceptions Clause nonetheless appears to have influenced the Court's
decision to opt for the permissive statutory interpretation, espe-

20 See

Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 96.
See Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 105-06.
20
B See Felker, 518 U.S. at 660, 664.
2" See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 908-09
(1984) (articulating the traditional view); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide
to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 258-60 (1973) (same); Herbert Wechsler,
The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005-06 (1965) (same); cf.
Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633, 1633-34 (1990) (rejecting newer theories of the Exceptions Clause).
10At the center of that discussion is Professor Henry Hart's "essential function"
test. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953) ("[T]he exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in
the constitutional plan."). "Essential functions" is a structural test for evaluating restrictions on Court jurisdiction by reference to (1) whether the Court constitutes a forum for resolving conflicting interpretations of federal law, and (2) whether the Court
provides a vehicle for preserving the supremacy of federal law. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1960). Professor Akhil Amar has argued that plenary Exceptions Clause authority is limited only by the requirement that other federal courts
must retain jurisdiction if it is stripped from the Supreme Court. See Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 255-57 (1985).
211 See Felker, 518 U.S. at 661-62.
207
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cially in light of some of the decision's dicta.212 Moreover, Justice
Souter's concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, expressly argued that a categorical bar on Supreme Court jurisdiction
would starkly present Exceptions Clause problems.213
For these "new" theories, the most important case is Ex parte
214
McCardle.
McCardle was a Confederate newspaper publisher
and soldier who inflammatorily opposed Reconstruction.' After
he was jailed for disturbing the peace, he sought and was denied
federal habeas relief in Mississippi. He appealed to the Supreme
Court, but before the Court decided the case, Congress stripped
the Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials of habeas relief in lower courts. The Court then dismissed the appeal for want
of appellate jurisdiction.2 16 In light of Yerger, which followed a year
later,217 McCardle is susceptible to two different readings: (1) as an
affirmation of Congress's plenary power to control the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction,' or (2) as a limited ruling allowing
exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction only where other
channels for review remain open.'
Although post-Felker cases have failed to resolve these Exceptions Clause questions formally, their mere existence fortifies
original habeas jurisdiction in two ways. First, the Exceptions
Clause issue is now thorny enough that, where the Supreme Court
may avoid reading a statute in a way that eliminates its entire appellate jurisdiction over certain subject matter, the Court is likely
to do so. Second, a statute eliminating original habeas jurisdiction
would probably risk the constitutionality of any corresponding certiorari restriction. From Congress's perspective, foreclosing original habeas jurisdiction (five votes for relief) would only make practical sense if, for the same subject matter, Congress restricts
certiorari jurisdiction (four votes). And, if Congress forces the
Court to consider the Exceptions Clause question by eliminating
original habeas as a backstop appellate jurisdiction, then the Court
212

See id. at 658-62.

213

See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring).

21474

U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 179 (3d ed. 1999).
216See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
at 515.
217 See Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 106.
21

2
219

See Van Alstyne, supra note 209, at 259-60.

See Hart, supra note 210, at 1365.
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could resolve the question in a way that invalidates all jurisdictional limits over the relevant issues. In that scenario, a congressional attempt to limit more exotic forms of appellate jurisdiction
would be counterproductive.
C. The Suitability of CapitalSubject Matter
A capital safety valve paradigm also makes sense because petitions attacking death sentences are uniquely amenable to review
under the substantive standards that precedent and Supreme Court
Rules prescribe for relief. Rule 20.4(a), which controls original habeas relief, requires: a statement of reasons for not seeking relief in
the district court with territorial jurisdiction over the confined prisoner; if the petitioner is a state prisoner, that the prisoner have exhausted state remedies; that adequate relief cannot be obtained in
any other form or from any other court; and that there be "exceptional circumstances" to warrant exercise of original habeas
power.220
The OHD shows that the major source of petitions meeting the
requirement that relief be available in no other form are petitions
that effectively seek to bypass the authorization procedure in 28
U.S.C. § 2224(b)(3). Within that category of Section 2244(b)related petitions, capital prisoners tend to present claims having
the best chance of satisfying the exceptional circumstances standard of Rule 20.4(a).221 I discuss the particular strength of claims attacking capital sentences in the two Subsections that immediately
follow. The two types of claims that are most likely to trigger original habeas scrutiny are claims of crime innocence and claims of
death ineligibility.222
1. Crime Innocence and Death Ineligibility Claims
The Supreme Court has almost surely become more sensitive to
the risk of executing an offender who did not commit the murder
See Sup. Ct. R. 20.
2 See Sup. Ct. R. 20.4.
m See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L. Rev.
329, 331-33 (2010) (distinguishing crime innocence and death ineligibility). What I
call "crime innocence" is usually called "actual innocence"; what I call "death ineligibility" is usually called "actual innocence of the death penalty." I favor the "crime innocence/death ineligibility" nomenclature in the interest of clarity.
2
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for which he was convicted,2' and original habeas petitions frequently contain claims that a prisoner is innocent.224 These claims
are usually referred to as "actual innocence" challenges, but I opt
for the phrase "crime innocence" because actual innocence claims
sometimes dispute only capital eligibility-not the prisoner's guilt
in the underlying murder.2' I use the term "death ineligibility" to
describe claims that dispute only whether the petitioner belongs to
a category of offenders for which the Eighth Amendment bars execution.226 Crime innocence and death ineligibility claims both appear disproportionately, for slightly different reasons, in successive
petitions. They also, therefore, appear frequently on the Court's
original habeas docket. The "death is different" proposition has
become one of the more contentious ideas in Justices' chambers,
but the Court nonetheless seems more willing to designate as "exceptional" cases that involve capital sentences.227
Crime Innocence. Original habeas is particularly central to adjudication of capital crime innocence challenges because so many of
them involve new DNA evidence that was unavailable at the time
of conviction or during the first round of habeas proceedings.2 2
DNA exonerations are fairly recent phenomena,2 and many
DNA-based capital post-conviction challenges appear for the first
time in successive petitions. DNA exonerations, along with other
high profile cases where the existence of wrongful executions
a See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
The OHD does not contain complete data regarding the incidence of innocence
claims. The data that is available, however, unsurprisingly indicates that the number
of such claims has increased along with the number of petitions actually filed.
mSee, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995) (applying the actual innocence rule to a successive petition); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)
(ag lying the actual innocence rule to a procedurally defaulted claim).
See generally Kovarsky, supra note 222, at 346-56 (discussing variants of ineligibility claims).
See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
mSee Eric Despotes, The Evidentiary Watershed: Recognizing a Post-Conviction
Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 821, 823-24 (2009).
m See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 186-87
(2009); see also Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (reporting that there have been 250
post-conviction exonerations since 1989, with 17 of those coming in death penalty
cases).
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seems likely,' have ushered in a new era of Supreme Court capital
scrutiny"-even for non-DNA crime innocence claims (as in
Davis2 ).
An appeals panel might deny authorization of a potentially meritorious crime innocence claim for a number of reasons: because it
considers the claim untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); 233 because
of some other technical defect, such as having been procedurally
defaulted in state court;2 because it construed the claim as having
been "presented in a prior application" and ordered the petition
dismissed under Section 2244(b)(1); 235 because it considered the
claim a "freestanding" crime innocence challenge not cognizable
on habeas review; 2' because the "factual predicate" could have
been discovered with due diligence under Section 2244(b)(2)(B);m
or because an authorization panel simply does not think that the
new material constitutes clear and convincing evidence of crime
innocence.' The important point here is not why potentially meritorious crime innocence claims are denied authorization, but that
the Supreme Court appears increasingly likely to find such claims
contained in original habeas petitions.

' See, e.g., David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, The
New Yorker, Sept. 7, 2009, http:// www.newyorker.com/ reporting/ 2009/ 09/ 07/
090907fa-fact_ grann?printable=true.
2 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 670-72 (2010) (per curiam opinion
conducting lengthy DNA analysis); Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009) ("Modern DNA testing can provide powerful
new evidence unlike anything known before.").
2
Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
mSee, e.g., In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (time barring an Atkins
claim in an authorization proceeding); In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same).
' See Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 778-83 (5th Cir. 1999) (indicating that
Congress permissibly "substitute[ed] the court of appeals for the district court as the
gatekeeper against abusive or procedurally defaulted claims").
" See, e.g., In re Hutcherson, 468 F.3d 747, 749 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to authorize a claim that the petitioner had raised in a previous habeas petition).
' See, e.g., In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009) (refusing to authorize a freestanding innocence claim).
' See, e.g., In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005) (refusing to authorize a subset of the petitioner's claims that did not satisfy § 2244(b)).
See, e.g., In re Diaz, 471 F.3d 1262, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to authorize a claim because new material would not demonstrate crime innocence by clear and
convincing evidence).
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Death Ineligibility. Original habeas relief may also play an increasing role in the adjudication of death ineligibility claims, which
also appear frequently in successive petitions subject to certiorari
restrictions.' The most important death ineligibility challenges, for
my purposes, are claims that a capital offender may not be executed because he is mentally retarded under Atkins v. Virginia,2 4 or
because he is not competent to be executed under Ford v. Wain242
I do not discuss claims that
wright4' and Panetti v. Quarterman.
Roper v. Simmons bars an offender's execution because he was under eighteen when he committed the offense because such claims,243
to my knowledge, are always resolved satisfactorily in state postconviction or clemency proceedings.'
Although appeals panels may deny authorization for meritorious
ineligibility claims on many of the same grounds that appeals panels deny authorization for crime innocence claims, there are three
additional complications that make ineligibility challenges particularly likely to require consideration in original petitions. First, ineligibility categories are usually announced as new rules of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review.245 That
means the ineligibility claim will frequently vest after an offender
a See cases cited infra note 245.
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
241 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
242 551 U.S. 930, 934-35 (2007).
240

2 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). I discuss Atkins, Ford, and
Roper claims in text, but there are other ineligibility claims that would not, for various
reasons, be as likely to invite the exercise of original habeas jurisdiction. For example,
a claimant may argue that he cannot be executed without the presence of sufficient
jury-found aggravators. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1992). In a different context, a claimant found guilty of felony murder cannot be executed without
the requisite mens rea. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
2

See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Sub-

stance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57
DePaul L. Rev. 721, 723 (2008) (noting that the ban on executing juvenile offenders
has prompted "virtually no litigation [because] offenders who committed the crime
before turning eighteen have had their sentences commuted via judicial or clemency
proceedings").
" See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60 (holding that the evolving national consensus
counseled against the execution of juveniles and applying this rule retroactively to vacate a death penalty verdict); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the "evolving standards of decency" prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded offender and vacating an existing death penalty verdict).
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has completed one round of federal habeas proceedings, and that
the offender will have to apply for authorization to litigate a successive petition. 2 ' There is an exception for new and retroactive
criminal laws in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A),247 but many of these
claims are not authorized because of some technical defect in the
forthcoming petition, such as being untimely or procedurally defaulted.2' Second, ineligibility claims must first be exhausted in
state post-conviction proceedings, but there is no right to state
post-conviction counsel and these claims are often defaulted.249
Third, Atkins claims often appear in original habeas petitions because authorization panels frequently defer to decisions from some
high-volume capital punishment states that use extraordinarily under-inclusive definitions of mental retardation.250
original habeas is not likely to be an important vehicle for enforcing
2Although
every ineligibility rule, it is nonetheless a potentially important vehicle for announcing
all of them. For example, four Justices dissented from the denial of an original habeas
hearing that would have adjudicated the constitutionality of executing offenders that
were minors at the time they committed the murder for which they were being capitally punished. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Roper declared such offenders ineligible for capital punishment three years later. See
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006).
See, e.g., In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusing to equitably
toll the limitations period because the petitioner's initial federal habeas petition had
been resolved three months before the AEDPA limitations period expired); Resendiz
v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying as successive and without merit an inquiry claim that the prisoner was not competent to be executed); In re
Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying on procedural grounds and without
merits an inquiry authorization to file a successive habeas petition containing an ineligibility claim); Nance v. Norris, 429 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the court's denial of authorization to an offender who had made
a prima facie showing of ineligibility); Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247
(11th Cir. 2004) (refusing to authorize a potentially meritorious claim of incompetence).
249See Celestine Richards McConville, The Meaninglessness of Delayed Appointments and Discretionary Grants of Capital Postconviction Counsel, 42 Tulsa L. Rev.
253,256 & n.31 (2006).
'

See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Appli-

cation in Capital Cases, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 625, 629 (2009); see also, e.g., Smith v. State,
No. CR-97-1258, 2009 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 2, at *11 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 16,
2009) (emphasizing that the petitioner did not have adaptive deficits because he could
function well in society, maintain a bank account, and perform other activities);
Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. 2007) (upholding state trial-court ruling because the state court found that defendant demonstrated ability to engage in romantic
relationship, drive a car, and obtain employment); Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892, 896-
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2. The "Exceptional Circumstances" Standard
The capital safety valve paradigm is also consistent with the substantive standard that the Supreme Court applies in the exercise of
its original habeas jurisdiction. Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a) requires a petitioner to state the "exceptional circumstances [that]
warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers."2 1' Rule
20.4(a) contains the unusual admonition that "[t]his writ is rarely
granted." 25 2 For decades, the "exceptional circumstances" standard
was considered a practically (if not formally) insurmountable impediment to original habeas relief. But as the OHD suggests and
Davis demonstrates, capital claimants seeking relief in successive
petitions are relatively well-positioned under Rule 20.4(a)'s substantive standard.253
First, reading the Rule 20.4(a) substantive standard more favorably for capital claimants is consistent with the way Rule 20.4
configures the accompanying procedure.For example, Rule 20.4(b)
provides that all original habeas proceedings, absent a show cause
order, proceed ex parte-except for capital cases. 25 4 Moreover, the
OHD shows that capital claimants are, by orders of magnitude, the
most well-represented category of habeas litigants." As a result of
these procedural features, capital cases are unique among original
habeas proceedings in that they are the only ones in which a jailor

97 (Miss. 2004) (upholding the lower court's determination that the petitioner did not
have adaptive deficits because the prisoner operated heavy machinery, was employed,
was admitted to radio operator school, legally drove a car, and provided for his family); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). These state tests,
often for psychiatric phenomena, almost always disqualify fewer offenders than do
federal standards, and they risk sentences that are simply erroneous under federal
law. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 244, at 728-29; Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the Model Penal Code,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 1396, 1409 (2005). Those rulings are nonetheless left undisturbed
because, under the federal habeas statute, decisions need only be "reasonable" determinations of fact and interpretations of law to withstand federal habeas scrutiny.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
" Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(a).
5 Id.
253Id.

Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(b).
See supra Subsection II.B.3.
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must respond and the only ones in which a prisoner must be represented.256
Moreover, the Rule 20.4(a) exceptional circumstances standard
has historically been a screen for cases in which more conventional
Supreme Court review was available-not for lower court decisions, such as orders denying authorization under Section 2244(b),
which are otherwise unreviewable. Understanding why the exceptional circumstances standard reinforces a safety valve paradigm
requires a short digression regarding the original habeas writ's relationship to the writ of error, which was the subject of several late
nineteenth-century cases. As Section I.B explained, in 1885 Congress created, for state prisoners, a right of appeal from lower court
dispositions in habeas cases. Ex parte Royall was the first state prisoner case under the 1885 Act.5 In Royall, the Court held that the
preferred form of Court review was a writ of error to the state
courts, not its original habeas power.2 " Because the statute required that state criminal judgments be final. before writs of error
issued, Royall's status as a statement of preference, rather than a
hard and fast rule, created pressure on the original habeas
docket." So that original habeas could not be used as an end run
around the writ of error requirement that the state conviction be
final, the Court transformed the "preference" into a much firmer
requirement that prisoners challenging criminal confinement seek
a writ of error first.26 In a series of cases starting in 1895, the Court
began to clarify that original habeas review could be used in place
of a writ of error in "exceptional circumstances."26' In 1943, the
'The Rule 20.4(b) exception for capital cases was added after Felker, 518 U.S. 651,
reaffirmed the viability of original habeas proceedings, so the differential treatment of
capital prisoners is not some artifact of an earlier era. See Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(b); Revisions to Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 169 F.R.D. 461, 463 (1997)
(recording the clerk's comment to Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(b)).
" See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247 (1886) (determining the meaning of the
Act of Feb. 5, 1867 (the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867)).
. See id. at 253.
See Hertz & Liebman, supra note 25, § 2.4d, at 57.
See In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 77 (1893). To ensure that the lower court habeas
requirements mirrored those of the Supreme Court, the Court also made the exhaustion requirement mandatory. See New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 98 (1894).
" See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 379-80 (1919) (positioning the exceptional
circumstances standard as an exception to the rule that "other available sources of
judicial power may not be passed by for the purpose of obtaining relief by resort to
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Court decided Ex parte Abernathy, holding that it "does not, save
in exceptional circumstances, exercise [its statutory jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in aid of appellate jurisdiction] in cases
where an adequate remedy may be had in a lower federal
court ..

..

"262 Abernathy is the basis for the original habeas substan-

tive standard.263 In short, the cases on which the modern substantive standard is based demonstrate that the exceptional circumstances requirement was not meant to apply when conventional
Supreme Court jurisdiction is restricted.
To be clear, Rule 20.4(a) expressly requires a prisoner to show
both exceptional circumstances and the inadequacy of other forms
of relief;21 the Supreme Court no longer limits the exceptional circumstances test to instances in which routine jurisdiction is available." But whatever the technical formulation of the modern standard, suffice it to say that there is a strong case that the exceptional
circumstances requirement does not obstruct review in the same
way it would if the Court could grant certiorari.
D. Remedial Desirability
Sections III.B and III.C explain why original habeas jurisdiction
and the Rule 20.4 standards for relief uniquely suit a capital safety
valve paradigm. This Section explains why original habeas remedies do the same. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) vests the Supreme Court or
an individual Justice with the authority to "decline to entertain ... [a habeas application and to] transfer the application for
hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction
the original jurisdiction of this court"); In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95, 100 (1895) ("Ordinarily
the writ will not lie where there is a remedy by writ of error or appeal; but in rare and
exceptional cases it may be issued although such remedy exists."); In re Chapman, 156
U.S. 211, 215 (1895) (identical language from Belt) (internal citations omitted).
262 320 U.S. 219, 219-20 (1943).
mSee Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 20, 71 (1954); see also Bennett Boskeya & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme
Court's New Rules for the Eighties, 85 F.R.D. 487, 510 (1980) (citing generally to the
exceptional circumstances standard).
2
The text of the rule states: "To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the
Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any
other form or from any other court." Sup. Ct. R. 20.4(a).
' For a discussion of obscure potential exceptions in WoT cases, see supra note
199.
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to entertain it." 21 Congress created the transfer remedy in 1948,
but the Court has used it only three times (Davis is one such instance).267 Consistent with the understanding of original habeas as a
safety valve, even in the two 1962 cases, the Court seemed willing
to use the transfer authority only where certiorari jurisdiction was
lacking.2" Where a transfer issued from an individual Justice's
chambers, it was only because the appropriate territorial jurisdiction for a district court petition was unclear.'
The most compelling justification for a capital safety valve paradigm is the availability of this transfer remedy. 270 The transfer remedy was conceived as an alternative to denying petitions involving
factual issues-precisely the role it would play in the capital context.271 Davis illustrates two salient remedial features, discussed in
the following two Subsections. First, a transfer allows a petitioner
to bypass not only the application procedure for authorization, but
also-arguably-the substantive restrictions on successive petitions. Second, the Court has other non-certiorari mechanisms to
§ 2241(b) (2006).

26628 U.S.C.
6 See Davis,

130 S. Ct. at 1; Hayes v. Maryland, 370 U.S. 931, 931 (1962); Chaapel
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 869, 869 (1962). Justice Douglas transferred a case in his capacity
as a Justice in 1973. See Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1327 (1973). Modern Justices
generally do not issue these rulings out of chambers. Gressman et al., supra note 2, at
666 (explaining that original habeas petitions are now distributed to the Court).
268In Hayes v. Maryland, the Court actually denied the motion (back then, applications were made in motion form), granted certiorari on the motion papers, and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. 370 U.S. at 931.
In Chaapel, the Court simply transferred the case. 369 U.S. at 869. Commentators
generally agree that the distinction was that, in Hayes, the original petition would
have been timely as a certiorari petition. See Oaks, supra note 8, at 194.
269 See Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. at 1327-28 (ordering transfer where officers in the
chain of command were generally in Washington, D.C.).
20 Because transfer authority kicks in only after the Court has declined to hear an
original petition, a transfer order could theoretically require fewer than five votes.
Because all four instances where the Court has exercised the transfer authority in the
last fifty years fall outside the OHD date range, there is simply no data to report
about this remedial power. See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1; Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. at
1327; Hayes v. Maryland, 370 U.S. at 931; Chaapel,369 U.S. at 869. And even the outof-range cases do not themselves indicate whether a transfer order requires five votes.
The two 1962 cases ordered a transfer without comment, the 1973 case was an order
that issued from Justice Douglas's chambers, and Davis was a per curiam opinion in
which the existence and/or identity of a fifth vote is not capable of determination
from the face of the order. There is currently not even a way to know whether a petition is formally considered a candidate for transfer at all.
" See Oaks, supra note 8, at 194.

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 113 2011

Virginia Law Review

114

[Vol. 97:61

consider the important questions of statutory interpretation that
arise out of authorization proceedings.
1. The Successive PetitionBypass Function
The first major reason that the transfer remedy is useful in capital cases is because it allows a prisoner to bypass certain substantive and procedural restrictions on successive petitions. Recall that
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) sets up the procedure for authorizing successive petitions in the federal circuit courts, but that Sections
2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) set forth the substantive standards for considering claims in those petitions. The Section 2244(b)(3) procedure requires an appeals court to authorize the entirety of a successive petition upon a prima facie showing that one of the claims it
contains meets the substantive standards of Sections 2244(b)(1)
and (b)(2). Section 2244(b)(4) requires that the district court dismiss claims that fail to satisfy any part of Section 2244, even if they
appear in a petition authorized under Section 2244(b)(3).272
When the question of whether the substantive limits in Sections
2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) applied to original petitions arose, the Court
declined to answer it."' The Davis transfer order instructs the district court to "receive testimony and make findings of fact as to
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of
trial clearly establishes petitioner's innocence." 27 4 That order departs from what would be required in a Section 2244(b)(2) inquiry
in a number of important ways. First, Section 2244(b)(2) requires
the prisoner to show that the factual predicate for the claim was
"previously unavailable," but the Davis transfer order instructs the
district court to consider any evidence discovered after trial, no
matter what its prior availability.275 Second, the Davis transfer order instructs the district court to determine if the extant body of
evidence clearly establishes the petitioner's innocence, whereas
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(4) (2006).
See Felker, 518 U.S. at 662-63 ("Whether or not we are bound by these restrictions, they certainly inform our consideration of original habeas petitions."). Some
members of the Court now view the Felker question more broadly to include whether
AEDPA is applicable to original habeas petitions at all. See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2
(Stevens, J., concurring).
274 Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
275 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
See

273
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Section 2244(b)(2) also requires that a petitioner prove some underlying constitutional error.276
In short, the Davis transfer order appears logically inconsistent
with the notion that the substantive restrictions in Sections
2244(b)(1) and (b)(2) apply in original habeas proceedings.277 Below this issue lurk some of the most complicated procedural questions that the transfer authority involves. Section III.E presents
these problems in more detail but, generally speaking, the questions center around exactly what authority the district court exercises after the Supreme Court transfers an original habeas application.
However these statutory questions are ultimately resolved, the
important point is that, by using its original habeas jurisdiction, the
Court enables consideration of a claim's factual merit. Ordering a
petition's transfer diminishes the likelihood that a claim it contains
will be denied as abusive, successive, untimely, or otherwise technically defective.278

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1. Indeed, this second feature of the Davis transfer order represents a potential earthquake for habeas corpus
doctrine generally (more on that infra Subsection III.E.2).
2' The Georgia district court recognized the implication of the
Supreme Court order
in a footnote. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2009 WL 2750976, at *1 n.3 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 26, 2009).
Interestingly, § 2244(b)(4) requires district courts to dismiss claims running afoul
of § 2244's substantive restrictions only if those claims appear in a petition that the
appeals court has authorized. This seemingly minor point may actually represent an
important incentive for the Court to favor its habeas jurisdiction over, say, its jurisdiction to award writs of mandamus (prisoners denied authorization will usually seek
both types of Supreme Court relief). As Subsection III.D.2 explains, a petition for a
writ of mandamus seeks an order from the Court instructing an inferior tribunal to
comply with written law, and it is likewise considered an extraordinary remedy under
Supreme Court Rule 20.4. If mandamus issued, it would presumably instruct the appeals court to authorize the successive petition. In such a procedural posture, the language in § 2244(b)(4) requiring the district court to dismiss all claims not meeting the
substantive requirements in that Section would apply. Not only would the district
court be bound to re-apply the statutory standard for successive and abusive claims
that the Court had chosen to bypass, but it would also be bound to apply the statute
of limitations, which appears in § 2244 as well. By opting for habeas jurisdiction over
the mandamus writ, the Court could sidestep procedural hurdles in § 2244(b). (There
is still a strong argument that § 2244(b)(1) and (2) apply of their own force, meaning
that a district court is required to dismiss claims in authorized petitions under those
provisions, and not under § 2244(b)(4).)
276
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2. Alternatives for Resolving Statutory Disputes
Other nontraditional appellate remedies are better suited to resolving pure issues of statutory interpretation that arise in successive federal proceedings. In conjunction with their original habeas
petitions, many prisoners will also seek a writ of mandamus under
the "All Writs" provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Felker's specific hold2
but its logic is equally
ing was limited to original habeas petitions, 79
applicable to petitions for mandamus writs. Three different Felker
Justices, across two different concurrences, emphasized that Section 2244(b)(3)(E) does not foreclose mandamus jurisdiction.o
Generally speaking, a mandamus writ instructs a public official
to perform a legal duty." The criteria for mandamus relief are also
set forth in Supreme Court Rule 20,' and a petitioner must make a
similar showing to that required in seeking an original habeas writ:
that the writ is in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of discretionary
power, and that he cannot obtain adequate relief in another form
or from another court."' Aside from the resolution of the underlying habeas claim and questions of guilt, the major issues that arise
under authorization proceedings involve the application of the authorization procedure itself.' For whatever reason, the Supreme
Court has simply declined to resolve increasingly stark divisions
over the authorization protocol in federal appeals courts. These divisions include whether Section 2244(b)(3) permits merits consideration of successive petition claims invoking new and retroactively
applicable constitutional law," as well as whether circuit courts
2 79

Felker, 518 U.S. at 654.

id. at 666 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
' Sup. Ct. R. 20.
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
' See Felker, 518 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The [Exceptions Clause]
question could arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the
gatekeeper standard.").
mCompare In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539, 542-44 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling that
an authorization panel should not consider limitations or exhaustion), and Ochoa v.
Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 543-44 (10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument
that § 2244(b)(3)(C) allows an authorization panel to consider the merits of a claim
based on new and retroactively applicable law), with In re Bowling, 422 F.3d 434, 436
(6th Cir. 2005) (permitting, on authorization, consideration of the merits of a
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) claim), In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2003) (same), In
o See

HeinOnline -- 97 Va. L. Rev. 116 2011

2011

OriginalHabeas Redux

117

may decide any of the State's potential affirmative defenses at the
authorization phase.6
With respect to deciding statutory interpretation questions that
arise under authorization proceedings, mandamus is a better procedural vehicle than original habeas. Using its mandamus power,
the Supreme Court can decide the underlying statutory questions
without issuing separate instructions to a district court as to how to
adjudicate the habeas claim. With mandamus, there are no questions involving whether or how a district court exercises jurisdiction granted to the Supreme Court. If mandamus issues, then the
petition will be authorized and the district court proceeds according to normal criteria. Mandamus would be the vehicle for deciding
questions of statutory interpretation in non-capital cases, or in
cases where the Court is for some other reason agnostic as to the
underlying constitutional claim's merit.
E. Problems with a CapitalSafety Valve Paradigm
The notion that original habeas could serve as a reliable safety
valve for otherwise unreviewable claims by capital prisoners is not
without its problems. I flag two of them below: (1) the questions
associated with what type of authority a district court exercises
when the Supreme Court transfers a case to it; and (2) what I call a
"cognizability paradox," which arises when the Court invokes
original habeas to resolve "freestanding" innocence claims.
1. Organicand Delegated Transfer Models
Recall that Section 2241(b) provides that the Supreme Court
"may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to
the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it."" What kind of
authority does the district court to which the case is transferred ex-

re Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), and In re Holladay, 331 F.3d
1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
2 Compare Ochoa, 485 F.3d at 545 (limiting authorization criteria to those specified
in the statute), with In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 797 (5th Cir. 2007) (permitting consideration of the statute of limitations), In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same), and Outlaw v. Sternes, 233 F.3d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
m828 U.S.C. § 2241(b).
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ercise-its own, organic power, or some power delegated by the
Supreme Court?
The answer to that question is, as a practical matter, quite significant. If the district court exercises organic authority, then it
should be bound by all ordinarily applicable Section 2244 restrictions, including the statutory limitations period and successive petition provisions.2 If, however, the district court exercises delegated
Supreme Court authority, then certain Section 2244 restrictions
may not apply. Under the delegated-power theory, Section 2244
restrictions apply only to the extent that they would apply to an
original petition adjudicated in the Supreme Court-and, based on
Felker, Section 2244(b) may not govern original habeas proceedings in that forum."
The Davis order assumes the delegated-power model, instructing
the district court only to determine whether new evidence shows
that Davis did not commit the murder for which he was convicted.2" The Georgia district court receiving the petition concluded-based on the language of the transfer order, Felker, and
Eleventh Circuit precedent-that Section 2244(b) did not apply in
the transferred proceeding.291 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, dismissing the appeal to it and holding that the appeal lay properly with
the Supreme Court.29
There is no law on the organic-versus-delegated original habeas
issue, but existing jurisdictional rules provide many reasons to be
skeptical of the delegated-authority model that Davis seems to
a

See id. § 2244(b) (successive petitions); id. § 2244(d) (statute of limitations).

9 See Felker,518 U.S. at 662-63.
290
The order in Davis instructed the district court to "receive testimony and make
findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time

of trial clearly establishes petitioner's innocence." Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
" See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010) ("Functionally, then, this Court is operating as a magistrate for the Supreme
Court, which suggests appeal of this order would be directly to the Supreme Court.
However, this Court has been unable to locate any legal precedent or legislative history on point."); see also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2009 WL 2750976, at *1 n.3
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2009) (citing Felker, 518 U.S. at 662-63; In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810,

826-27 (11th Cir. 2009)).
2" See Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2010). At the time of publication,
the Supreme Court is considering appellate review of the issue. See Davis v. Terry,
625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jan. 21,
2011) (No. 10-949); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Davis v. Humphrey, No. 10-949

(Jan. 21, 2011).
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adopt. First, a Section 2241(b) transfer is not a conventional Supreme Court delegation, like the appointment of a Special Master
in original jurisdiction cases.293 Whereas a proceeding involving a
Special Master remains on the Court's docket, a habeas petition is
transferred under Section 2241(b) only after the Supreme Court
has declined to entertain it.2" Second, in concurrent original jurisdiction contexts-instances in which the Supreme Court shares
original jurisdiction with other federal courts2 95-the Supreme
Court can discretionarily decline jurisdiction, but it still cannot
command a district court to hear the case. 2 9 Third, the Section
2241(b) delegated-power model lacks any analogue in other forms
of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. With respect to certiorari
specifically, the Court may: dismiss a petition as improvidently
granted;2m grant, vacate, and remand in light of some intervening
decision that pre-dates argument;2 or remand the case with

93

See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 129 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2009) (adjudicating, in an
original jurisdiction case, a dispute between Kansas and Colorado regarding the Arkansas River); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 397 (2000) (determining, in an
original jurisdiction case, state and tribal rights to the Colorado River); New Jersey v.
New York, 526 U.S. 589, 589 (1999) (holding, in an original jurisdiction case, that New
Jersey retained sovereignty over parts of Ellis Island). A Special Master issues subpoenas, adjudicates motions, procures witness testimony, collects evidence, and sometimes presides at a trial. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86
Minn. L. Rev. 625, 654-55 (2002). Indeed, this is one of the theories Davis urged in his
requests for review, filed roughly one month before the publication of this Article.
See Jurisdictional Statement and Petition for Habeas Corpus and a Common Law
Writ of Certiorari, Davis v. Humphrey, No. 10-950, at 33 (Jan. 21, 2011).
29428 U.S.C. § 2241(b).
2" See Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 n.1 (1992). With respect to all subject
matter constitutionally specified as within its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
generally shares concurrent original jurisdiction with lower federal courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251. The lone exception involves controversies between states, which are subject to
the Supreme Court's exclusive and original jurisdiction. Id.
96
' See, e.g., California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027, 1027 (1981) (declining exclusive jurisdiction over an alleged breach of an agreement to play football games between
state universities).
2
9 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436, 1436 (2009) (dismissing certiorari petition in tobacco litigation).
2 See, e.g., Wellons v. Hall, 130 S. Ct. 727, 731 (2010) ("A GVR is appropriate
when intervening developments... reveal a reasonable probability that the decision
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity
for further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may de2
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instructions after deciding it.29
The original habeas transfer conundrum is this: by instructing
district courts to conduct non-AEDPA inquiries, the Supreme
Court is either directing inferior courts to ignore a statute or it is
delegating its own authority without any clear precedent to do so.
Of course the alternative-requiring district courts to apply
AEDPA as though a court of appeals had authorized the petition
under Section 2244(b)(3)-has its own major problems. Most importantly, it would effectively obliterate the transfer remedy as a
viable means of circumventing any procedural obstacle other than
the appellate authorization protocol. I flag these issues because the
Section 2241(b) delegated-power question is likely to recur,"o but it
deserves more robust treatment than this Article allows.
2. The Cognizability Paradox
The major problem with using original habeas as a means of
scrutinizing capital sentences actually has little to do with any distinction between the Supreme Court's powers and those of inferior
federal tribunals, and it reflects a major theme from Part I. The
most contentious issue in Davis was not a question about the Supreme Court's Article III appellate jurisdiction, but whether the
underlying claim-freestanding crime innocence-is even cognizable under the federal habeas statute. I describe as the "cognizability paradox" the idea that original habeas is most likely to be used
to reach many crime-innocence claims by capital prisoners for
which, as I explain in the following paragraph, the statutory cognizability has not been definitively established. The cognizability
paradox captures the gist of what Justice Scalia was disputing when
he described the transfer order in Davis as a "fool's errand." 1
termine the ultimate outcome of the matter.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
' See, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 578 (2009) (vacating and remanding
with instructions to dismiss the cause).
"In fact, at the time of this writing, the question seems to be presented to the Supreme Court in the Davis case itself. See supra notes 291-92. The district court held
that, because the Supreme Court transferred the case, Davis's appeal lies with the Supreme Court itself-not with the Eleventh Circuit. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130,
2010 WL 3385081, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
that ruling. See Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2010).
*' Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A "freestanding" crime-innocence claim alleges that a prisoner
is innocent of capital murder, and the innocence allegation does
not supplement some other constitutional challenge? Whether
freestanding crime-innocence claims are even cognizable on federal habeas review remains an open question. 3 For example, in his
first round of habeas proceedings, recall that Davis alleged his innocence alongside Strickland, Brady, and Giglio claims? Because
those familiar constitutional claims would be categorically barred
under the successive claim rules in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), his second federal habeas petition alleged only his innocence.
The habeas statute authorizes relief only for constitutionalviolations,' and the Court has been unable to resolve the question of
which constitutional provision a freestanding crime-innocence
claim actually invokes.' The central case on the freestanding
crime-innocence issue is Herrera v. Collins." A Texas state court
capitally sentenced Herrera, who claimed in a successive federal
" More precisely speaking, a claim is "freestanding" whenever a prisoner does not
prove an accompanying constitutional violation. These situations include where the
offender makes no accompanying constitutional claim, where the petitioner made the
claim but its merits cannot be decided because it was subject to a successful procedural defense, or where the petitioner simply lost on the merits of the constitutional
claim.
. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 424-27 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Herrera majority opinion contained dicta suggesting that a freestanding innocence claim might not be cognizable. See id. at 401 (majority opinion) ("Few rulings
would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence."). The Court passed on the freestanding innocence question again in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006), and
in DistrictAttorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321-22 (2009).

a' See supra notes

186-88 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to
a prisoner unless .. . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States .. . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (restricting relief for state prisoners to claims that they are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
" Most freestanding innocence arguments involve some combination of the Eighth
Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of substantive due process, or the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
procedural due process. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 431, 432 & n.2 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Eighth Amendment); id. at 435-36 (substantive due process);
Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-Sentenced
Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 943, 1021-22 (1994) (procedural
due process).
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
'
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petition that he was actually innocent of the murder?' Herrera argued that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid a state
from executing an actually innocent offender and that he was
therefore entitled to federal habeas relief." The Supreme Court
denied relief without reaching the broad question the case presented, holding only that Herrera's specific case did not involve an
Eighth Amendment violation and, because some state corrective
process was available, that Texas did not run afoul of procedural
due process guarantees.3"o The Court, however, made clear that it
was punting on the freestanding crime-innocence question."' The
Court has conspicuously declined to decide the cognizability issue
three times in the last four terms, including in Davis.312
What the Court did make clear in Davis is that it will locate any
bar on crime-innocence relief-if any exists-in a jurisdictional
limit common to all federal courts, not in a limit on its Article III
appellate power. Even the two dissenting Justices did not seem to
object to the Court's power to issue the transfer, just to the practical value of doing so in light of the authority of lower courts to
grant ultimate relief. For that reason, original habeas is likely to
remain a viable means of reviewing crime-innocence decisions in
n Id. at 396.
* Id. at 398.
Id. at 405-08, 411.

310

"'See id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court did state in dicta that
"[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been
held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding." Id. at 400. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing that the Court had not resolved the freestanding innocence question. Id. at
427 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun, Souter, Stevens, and White each
wrote or joined in separate opinions that would have recognized the cognizability of
freestanding innocence claims. See id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (proposing a
standard that would require a petitioner to show that "no rational trier of fact could
find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt") (alterations, citations, and internal
quotation marks omitted); id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (proposing a standard
that would require a petitioner to "show that he probably is innocent").
3' See Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321-22 (2009); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). The
Davis district court, however, has determined that a prisoner alleging actual innocence states a cognizable constitutional challenge. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130,
2010 WL 3385081, at *43 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) ("It can be said, then, that executing the 'actually' innocent violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.").
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capital proceedings, at least as long as those claims are cognizable
in federal habeas proceedings.
CONCLUSION

For most of the nineteenth century, original habeas empowered
the Supreme Court to decide issues created by criminal confinement. Over the course of the twentieth century, the original habeas
power evolved into a potential means of resolving important constitutional questions for which certiorari jurisdiction was unavailing. Until now, there has been no data about what sorts of cases
required such resolution. The OHD, however, allows commentators to quantify what the Court and the parties before it actually do
in original habeas proceedings.
In spite of its other theoretical uses, original habeas jurisdiction
has evolved primarily into a vehicle for successive habeas litigation.
Original habeas authority allows the Supreme Court to consider
otherwise unreviewable challenges to criminal confinementincluding new types of challenges to capital sentences. Specifically,
the substantive standard for relief appears to carve out the special
importance of capital petitions, and the transfer remedy makes
original habeas a desirable means of bypassing procedural obstacles in cases that nonetheless present heavily contested evidentiary
issues. The advent of DNA testing, renewed skepticism of guilt determinations, and Eighth Amendment capital eligibility restrictions
all place pressure on the Court to use its original habeas authority
in ways that were unnecessary just fifteen years ago. If the OHD
and Davis are any indications, after almost a century-long period of
virtual dormancy, the Supreme Court's original habeas power may
be on a revival's precipice.
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